PHILOSOPHY PATHWAYS Issue 27

In this article, I describe the specific characteristics of the non-classical paradigm of reading and compare it with the classical philosophy. 'Classical philosophy' is here not restricted to ancient philosophy but is the form of European metaphysics, which aims to gain clearness of definitions, accuracy of argumentation, completeness of philosophical systems, hierarchy of philosophical knowledge, and to be rooted in historical understanding of the evolution of thought. That is why I believe that classical philosophy is close to scientific principles. Science seems to provide the ideal scheme of such an approach.

By 'non-classical' philosophy I mean the tradition of structural and post-structural philosophy, which escapes, rather than rejects the systematic character of philosophy. The main distinctive principle of non-classical philosophy is this escaping from metaphysics, with its thinking in oppositions: 'good and evil', 'truth and lie', 'complete and coming-to-be'. There are no such oppositions in non-classical philosophy; accordingly, all forms of philosophy are acceptable. In my view, non-classical philosophy begins with Friedrich Nietzsche's avoidance of the opposition between 'good' and 'evil' ('Beyond Good and Evil'). That is why non-classical philosophy in my mind is still part of classical philosophy, rather than being opposed to it: not the rejection of classical philosophy, but the widening of the borders of the classical tradition.

I want to analyze the non-classical reading paradigm, because the sphere of text reading, I think, is where the main difference between classical and non-classical philosophy is shown. Of course, reading is the universal method of working with text; but reading is not only a physical act, but also the process of understanding as well as mastering the text and criticism. I share with Roland Barthes the opinion that the text is formed by the reader rather than by the author. I attempt, in what follows, to show how classical philosophy is succeeded by the non-classical, and also, how classical positions in philosophy are re-comprehended by non-classical ones.

Non-classical philosophy was formed not only as the opposition to classical philosophy, but as the constructive reflection on it, that is, an attempt to solve the problems posed by the previous epoch. In the end, non-classical philosophy became not so much an overcoming of classical thinking traditions, as continuation of it.

Non-classical philosophy does not reject these principles (although the prefix 'non' can entail this rejection), but puts the same question in another perspective. This aspiration for re-comprehension of history from un-scientific positions has been criticized by classical philosophers for its destruction of scientific values. But here, it is more correct to say 'simulation' rather than destruction. J. Baudrillard's notion, 'simulation,' is understood by classical philosophers as synonymous with 'in-complete', therefore un-scientific and un-true. But the very fact that classical philosophers attempt to criticize the non-classical paradigm of reading a text from a scientific position shows that their approach is tactless; tactless because the sphere of science and that of knowledge are not the identical, which means there is a sphere of un-scientific knowledge. This is the sphere that includes religious, mystical knowledge, the acquisition of which entails neither conscious mental activity nor cognitive work. Science is a method of acquiring knowledge, but not the only one.

This is to suggest that knowledge is not necessarily rational or, put more specifically, scientific; knowledge and science are not identical terms. Therefore, as non-classical philosophy postulates a position outside the scientific sphere, all arguments coming from critics working within the scientific position, who thereby deprecate anti-scientific values from that point of view, are off the point.

Non-classical philosophy escapes from the opposition of scientific and un-scientific, postulating principles of reading that are neither one nor the other. Non-classical philosophy does not share the classical (scientific) position; therefore, it does not enter into an argument with it. There is no resistance from non-classical philosophy as such, because it rejects none of the classical principles; it escapes the oppositional structure of 'scientific vs. un-scientific', 'real vs. profane', 'proper philosophy vs. mere philosophizing', etc. That is why it is so difficult for critics working within the classical paradigm to recognize the merits of non-classical philosophers.

Non-classical philosophy, whilst acknowledging the scientific nature of philosophy, re-establishes its philosophical position against such background. Consequently, the non-classical tradition defines philosophy as the form of out-of-scientific (neither scientific nor un-scientific) thinking. In this way, the philosophical motivation of the classical epoch, for instance, which sought to answer the global questions of truth, human being, God, etc., becomes invalid. Non-classical philosophy refuses to answer these questions, because it rejects the notion of a single answer. As time goes by, the meaning of such global questions along with the way they are treated always changes. There are many answers and many opinions. To such a crisis of increasingly numerous philosophical systems, doctrines and ideas about truth, human being, God, one can respond by acknowledging that every one of them is correct, insofar as every position is unique in its own right. The fact that there are so many different philosophies, so many different thinkers, is evidence of such a crisis. So, philosophy as the form of universal truth creation, according to M. Foucault, dies.

To this I can add: classical philosophy dies; and yet, philosophy as a form of dialectical thinking will go on. And non-classical philosophy in seeking after another kind of reading is an attempt to withdraw from that crisis.

First of all, non-classic philosophy re-evaluates classical philosophy's relation with science. Such scientific orientation was the form of adaptation and mimicry. Science and the idea of 'ratio' were the authoritative discourse for studies in the Age of Enlightenment. Knowledge was perceived as rational, as scientific; and therefore, every sphere of human activity, which pretended to be based on knowledge, had to be scientifically oriented. This tendency was reflected in rational theology, rational psychology and rational cosmology, which, when put all together, form Christian Wolf's philosophical system. Reason and science served as a criterion of veritable of knowledge. Therefore, philosophy had to become a science, too.

In order to prove scientifically that philosophy has cognitive value, philosophy had to create a series of global questions, set up a methodology, and invent special terms, building the hierarchy of philosophical knowledge. To prove the validity of philosophy, it had to put on the mask of science. This classical tradition created a new form of philosophy, constituted on the basis of the opposition between 'clear vs. vague', 'argument vs. metaphor', 'science vs. poetry'. Preference was always given to the first term of these oppositions.

Although non-classical philosophy escapes from such oppositions in overcoming metaphysics, it still retains the dialectical principle of thinking. At the same time, rejection of the scientific basis of philosophy is a tendency visible in the aspirations of some philosophers of the 20th century who adopt different forms of writing: fiction, poetry, and literary criticism. Albert Camus, for instance, expressed such an idea, namely that the philosopher of the 20th century has to write novels. There is an obvious aspiration to the non-rational sphere of creation.

However, these principles do not negotiate with philosophical experiences from the past; non-classical philosophy, being more concrete in its approach, does not aspire to answer the global questions which look for a unique answer. The aim of this concrete non-classical philosophy is to read the texts in a broad sense of the word, 'reading'. According to Jacques Derrida, there is nothing outside the text and every human activity can be perceived as a form of writing; and in this regard, every product of human work can be interpreted as the text (Derrida 'On Grammatology').

It is necessary to examine the peculiarities of the non-classical mode of reading philosophy. Classical philosophy investigated the historical and scientific aspects of texts, i.e. concrete cultural context, which determines the structure and evolution of written texts. It is necessary to know the original language in which a given text is written not so much in order to understand the sense of the text, as to analyze the cultural context. And it is necessary to know the native history and language (Saussurian 'langage') of the author. Although non-classical philosophy inherits this principle, it does not treat the text as a self-identical entity, which classical philosophy does insistently. The principle of self-identity regards a text as defined by the frames of national language, culture and epoch. Classical philosophy insists on this principle, which is why it demands that the reader carry out all the duties I listed earlier.

For a non-classical reader, the text can be read, whether it remains self-identical or not. Therefore one can read the text out of the epochal or cultural context, as well as out of - that is, against - the author's position. This principle was formulated by G. Bataille in the course of his reading of Hegel; his point is, namely that we can read Hegel's works not only out of German cultural context, but out of Hegel himself. Non-classical philosophy does not reject the classical principles, but takes off ('Aufheben') the burden of austerity, which insists in viewing the text as a self-contained totality.

Non-classical philosophy is premised upon the principle that the text is determined by the given cultural context of the reader, not by that of the author. When reading a text, a non-classical reader accentuates the very process of reading, which depends on the reader's native language, culture and the epoch in which he is present, but not on the self-identity of the text, treated by classical philosophy as the immutable, total and stable code of information, rigidly determined by the culture and epoch in which it was written. Seen from the non-classical point of view, reading should not submit itself to this code; on the contrary, this code can be determined by the reader. Therefore non-classical philosophy resists the monosemantic (i.e. self-identical) treatment of the text as well as the complete cognitive mastery over it. Seen from the classical point of view, the reader is one who understands all the senses created by the author; consequently, the sense of the text is limited and static. A non-classic reader understands a text as a dynamic system, which itself develops in the course of reading.

The main principle of non-classical reading is proposed by Barthes (and also by Umberto Eco) who argues that the text is formed by the reader rather than by the author. There are no limits or completion to the text, because it is created by the process of reading, which is as endless as the present itself. At the same time, non-classical philosophy inherits the principle of cultural determinism from classical philosophy. It acknowledges that the reader's interests are determined by his mother tongue and present culture. Senses of a text are formed by the reader's language, culture and epoch, not by the author's. To this extent, the writer, as well as the reader, is subject to cultural determinism.

Non-classical philosophy, especially poststructuralism, is premised upon the principle that writing ('ecriture') is not submitted to thinking (or, likewise, to logic and truth). Writing is the universal form of human activity, and thinking itself (taken as an act of creating truth and objectivity) can be treated as a form of writing. If, as Derrida says, writing is more primary than thinking, reading is not the process of deciphering encrypted thoughts, but, itself, paradoxically, a form of writing. When reading a text, the non-classical reader creates another text, which is a treatment of the first one. The reader is always a writer. This idea is very close to that of Barthes, who maintains that a text is formed by the reader rather than by the author. That is why non-classical philosophy does not aspire to answer the global question of thinking, but is devoted to reading and treating texts. Non-classical philosophy treats philosophy as a method of reading, not as a method of explaining the world, which classical philosophy insisted on doing.

In this regard, I can make sense of Barthes's thesis about the author's death, namely that there is no one sense of the text created by the author and his cultural mentality. There is no one treatment of the text. Barthes uses the image of the author inclusively: it contains culture, epoch, and mentality of writer - all at once. The author symbolises the self-identity of the text: it is the power that, by giving self-identity to the text, ensures its integrity. So, to read a text from the classical point of view is to attempt to read it from the author's point of view by assuming his mental position. By contrast, Barthes postulated ('declare') the non-authorial basis of a text: it means that there is no such power which gives self-identity and gathers a text into one. Therefore, we can read a text without considering its self-identity, and likewise, without considering its authorial power.

Non-classical philosophy, according to Derrida, interprets a text as a totality of human products, and all human activities are forms of writing. In non-classical philosophy, there are no borderlines between the text, reading and the treatment of the text, because the process of reading depends on, and is determined by, the present. Changing the present culture and mentality of the reader entails changing the course of reading and treatment. There are no limits and completeness of the text, because the text is created by a process of reading.

Non-classical philosophy considers objectivity as a product of concrete culture. Therefore, there is no objectivity as such. There are many kinds of objectivity created by different cultures and epochs. But this consideration does not reject scientific thinking or scientific method, but takes it as merely one of the forms of writing.

"..to enrich our lives, and the lives of those around us
through the study of philosophy." - Pathways web site

On the last day of February, with the click of a mouse the International Society for Philosophers was launched. There was no fanfare. there were no solemn speeches. The aim of the Society: to promote philosophy and its practical benefits throughout cyberspace.

The International Society for Philosophers will be a sister organization to the Philosophical Society of England, providing a forum for discussion and debate in cyberspace to complement the growing number of local Philosophical Society groups meeting around the UK as well as overseas. The International Society has now taken responsibility for running the Pathways and Diploma programs, reflecting the massive increase in interest in the Pathways correspondence courses from outside the UK and via the internet.

I have heard it said that the internet is the home of hype and immodest ambitions. For every web site that is growing and thriving, there is a ghost town of sites half-built, frozen in disuse. Down any cyber street you will find monuments to personal vanity, comic and grotesque, relics of enthusiasms that flared briefly then burned themselves out, get-rich-quick schemes that rapidly went bust. Anyone with half an hour to spare can learn how to make their pipe dream a cyber 'reality'.

None of this inclines me to pessimism. The International Society for Philosophers is not venturing on its voyage alone, but with the steady support and good will of all those who have contributed to and participated in the Pathways programs over the past seven years.

Amongst the hundred or so applications for membership that I have received since the Society was launched, have been many offers of help with the day-to-day running of the Society, or writing a Constitution, or formulating aims and objectives, or designing a web page, or designing a logo for the web page - the list goes on. I will be replying to each e-mail individually. Here I would just like to take the opportunity to thank everyone who has written to me for their encouragment and support.

In time, the International Society for Philosophers will have its own web site, with an online philosophy conference open to all members of the Society. (This follows the successful second launch of the Pathways Conference which has received an impressive 134 electronic postings in just two months.) There will also be topical articles, an archive of Fellowship dissertations, and a contact board to enable members with similar interests to form e-mail discussion groups. If anyone has any more ideas, just let me know!

If you are already a Pathways student or a member of the Philosophical Society of England, there is no need to submit your details a second time. Just let me know that you would like to join the International Society for Philosophers. Please note that you are not a member until you apply.

I brought along a friend from our Chesterfield Group to the Conference; not without fear and trepidation I must add, for the two of us.

We had a couple of concerns. One was whether or not we would be out of our depth in terms of Philosophical discussion and thus become non-participants. The other, not unrelated to the first, was whether we could be part of the 'Workshops' and contribute to their output.

However we bit the bullet and thoroughly enjoyed the weekend. I suppose the motivating factors were a first for us at a Philosophical Conference, and a conference which was discussing the same subject matter as our group: Morality.

It is true that we tried to add some sensible contribution to the debates, but where these became too technical for us we approached them as a form of learning experience.

Of the three papers presented we enjoyed most the one on Nietzsche, but maybe that was due to a level and style that best mirrored our capability; each of the papers caught our interest and have added to our understanding of the possibility of morality.

The workshops were not as intimidating as our fears suggested but were definitely challenging.

Where we found the most benefit was in the informal discussions that took place, often for hours on end with no diminution of interest. Indeed, these could have continued except for the demands of sleep and the next day.

We met many people that were interesting as individuals new to us, as well as being interesting for their views on morality. It was therefore with some sorrow that we heard from Mike Bavidge that we had most likely attended the last Shap Conference. Indeed one individual had been going to Shap for over two decades so this announcement must have been particularly meaningful.

All l that we can say is that if you get something together for next year we would look forward to meeting up with you all again.

It will take me some time to absorb the content of the presentations...I'm feeling rather overwhelmed with the volume of ideas raised.

However, both the format and location of the conference was very good with ample time given for discussion on the issues raised in the presentations. The order in which I would rate the presentations (not the content) was Toby, yourself then Michael.

From a personal viewpoint...philosophy has and still does worry me. The fear I have is getting so deep into the forest of philosophy that I loose sight of the wood. I listened to a number of discussions over the weekend that left me wondering from which planet these people had come - still it would be very boring if we all thought in the same way, I guess.

All closed groups develop a language of their own, a sort of verbal shorthand, 'Kantian this' or 'Humean that' can create a feeling of exclusion which does little to improve its accessibility to newcomers - if getting newcomers is on the agenda! We all slide into this verbal shorthand and I'm no exception but that only makes it understandable not acceptable. Personally I would also like to ban name-dropping or references to published works as answers to questions - they're not answers, they are responses. If there is a point to be made then simply make it without saying 'X wouldn't agree with that'.

Of all the workshops sessions the last one with yourself seemed to be the most productive with some interesting perspectives being voiced. Again this is another criticism I have of philosophy (or maybe philosophers) a complete lack of visual aids or diagrams. It is said a picture is worth a thousand words, I suspect its much more than that and it certainly quickly fixes ideas in my mind, although I've heard it said that whilst everyone has a photographic memory not everyone has a film in the camera :-)

www.geoffreyklempner.net

klempner@fastmail.net

International Society for Philosophers

Wisdom begins with wonder