Robert asked:

To what extent does Nietzsche's philosophy deserve to be tainted with Nazism?

You may not realise it, but this is a LOADED question! And although there are several ways of handling it, I will suggest something to you which is always a good way of defusing it: before asking it in just these terms, be sure that you have at least a working acquaintance with Nietzsche's philosophy and ditto with Nazi ideology. For if that's the case, then you might find that any relationship between Nietzsche and Nazism is a matter of third parties, invariably with vested interests, making that connection, which does not in any genuine sense exist. I would go even further and assert that the more you become acquainted with his writings, the less similarity you will find. Mind you, there are causes why the 'taint' arose; but again this is neither Nietzsche's doing nor indeed that of the Nazis themselves, whose 'leading lights' (if you wanted to call them that) would hardly ever be caught reading a philosopher! And on the other side, although he's not around to confirm my opinion, I think Nietzsche himself would have recoiled in horror at the election of the Nazi Party, let alone their doings once they held the reins of power.

But I owe you at least a hint of an account, why people keep sniffing around Nietzsche to find if the odour of proto-Nazism, which once was believed to be clinging to him, is still there. Essentially they are two. Firstly, there is a certain amount of 'incendiary' writing in his work, and some of it is couched in language that can easily be bent to suit an ideology if that happens to be your intention. So certain phrases like "I philosophise with a hammer", "blonde beast", "Uebermensch", "herd mentality", "master race" and so on got stripped of their philosophical vestments and thrust into a sub-intellectual political milieu where they could hardly stand up as the concepts they were in their own environment, but got turned into slogans. But you must surely have heard that Nietzsche felt himself to be an apostle of the aristocracy of mankind; and now try and match that attitude to beer hall speeches, the Nuremberg rally, Hitler Youth and so on: the very "canaille" he never tired of raging against. And yet he was fulminating against Germany when there was 'Kultur' there, with a capital "K". I think Nazism would have exceeded his capacity to believe in its very possibility. However, there is another reason, equally important. Nietzsche had the misfortune that a totally unscrupulous sister 'looked after' his posthumous fame, who outlived him by decades and spent most of that time 'editing' his letters and manuscripts by painstaking forgery of his handwriting. In particular she was concerned that posterity would not read those letters of his where he told her 'home truths' of the most unpleasant kind, including her political affiliations and her antisemitism. With Hitler, by the way, she got on like a house on fire.

But the worst 'service' she rendered her dead brother was to publish his projected book, The Will to Power. This book was throughout the early decades of the 20th century regarded as his chef d'oeuvre. You should be aware that Nietzsche is not responsible for its contents; for although many of the words and sentences are his, their arrangement is a wilful distortion and the best thing to do (as editors have done ever since the 1950s) is to ignore its existence and read the aphorisms in the higgledy-piggledy order in which they were written. In a word, the book is a forgery, a concoction of paragraphs in a sequence calculated to rouse a certain impression that does not reflect Nietzsche's intentions (what little we know of them). Who among scholars could have known this during the years of the fascist hegemony? They didn't and accepted the book as what it purported to be. But we, today, who know better, should of course draw the consequence and let the 'Nazi case' dies its natural death. In a way the continued hankering after it is becoming a manner of refusing to look into his philosophy and find ourselves depicted as in a horrid distorting mirror! Nietzsche was a prophet; and as you know, they're always a prickly lot. My feeling is that it would be much more useful to pursue the question, why and how did Nietzsche become such an easy prey to bowdlerisation, and not just by the Nazis? But let me end as I began: there is no case; and to prove this you need do no more than read his works. If in addition you can spare the time to read into Nazi ideology, you will only strengthen the case. But I for one doubt it is worth the effort. Nietzsche was a great philosopher, and in itself this is incompatible with Nazism. Accordingly I think it is high time we stop looking for things he didn't say and affiliations he didn't foster and start paying attention to the things he did say.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Selina asked:

Do I exist...more generally, do we exist? If so, how can we possibly prove this, in accordance to everything around us that supposedly exists as well?

Do you exist? Well, I'll tell you what... you tell me what you mean by "exist" and I'll answer your question. How about that?

What does it even mean to ask that question? Doesn't your asking it imply some sort of existence? If not, why not? If you can question your existence and you don't exist, then who's asking? Who is asking whom? What are you doing?

Or maybe you're just trying to puzzle the "philosophers" here? Hey, whatever. But I, or anyone else here, is not going to give you a better answer than to ask you how it is you can ask that, or any other question, if you don't "exist" in the first place, in some sense of that term.

Steven Ravett Brown

Chrissy asked:

Are verbal contracts binding?

In English Law oral contracts are generally binding. The exceptions are contracts for the sale of land and contracts for the assignments of debts. These have to be written.

Of course, the difficulty with an oral contract, if you want to sue on it, is proving in Court that it exists and what its terms are.

John Sartoris

In English law, all contracts are binding and have legal force insofar as they create legal responsibilities, generate rights and obligations and allow for recourse to the legal system if responsibilities and are not met. There are cases when contracts are not binding, such as when a contract has been entered into under duress or there has been misrepresentation.

A contract is defined in terms of offer, agreement and consideration. A verbal contract is not just a promise to do something. It is an essential element to the existence of a contract that both parties intend to become legally bound. The parties must also have legal capacity and excluded categories are persons of unsound mind, drunkards and minors. My contract books don't mention drug addicts, but I suppose they would be classified as of unsound mind.

Consideration is the reason for the enforcement of a promise. The law obviously cannot uphold all promises. You might think that a promise made by parties with the intent to become legally bound would be sufficient for a contract, but it is the consideration that allows the court to know how to assess the nature of the compensation. Consideration is vital. 'A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other' (A Casebook on Contract by Smith Thomas quoting Currie and Misa). Contract law in England, by the way, is case law rather than statutory law which means that the law is determined by rulings in particular cases by the courts rather than parliamentary statute. Case law can be quite funny (amusing!). It has been ruled that consideration need not be adequate but must be sufficient (or real). Smith notes that if I make a promise to you for supplying three chocolate wrappers which are quite useless and you were going to throw them away anyway, this would be perfectly good consideration because of the rule that the court will not enquire into the adequacy of the consideration so long as it is real. Even though you were going to throw the chocolate wrappers away anyway, you have parted with something you might have kept so this is considered 'detrimental' in accordance with the definition of consideration according to the courts!

But although it is a general rule that the courts of England don't require that a contract is written to make it valid, there are exceptions such as in the sale of land or where this is determined by statute.

Rachel Browne

Yes they are. Trouble is, they may be hard to prove. As Samuel Goldwyn (the great film producer) once said, "Verbal contracts aren't worth the paper they are written on."

Ken Stern

Sarah asked:

What can be said about the claim that happiness is simply pleasure?

Sarah also asked:

What is a virtue? What virtues do we need in order to live a good life?

Over the centuries many philosophers have written about happiness being nothing deeper than a sense of pleasure, the absence of pain, uninvolvement in serious affairs etc. Among the Greeks, Epicurus is foremost; among the Chinese Yang Chu has written some beautiful stories and prose sketches on the subject (I for one far prefer these to the dour Epicurus, who seems to me almost hysterically concerned with his menu, health, fears and other worries: Yang Chu is more interested in fine clothes, food, entertaining in style and philosophising on death — in a gentle and happy sort of way). Among more modern philosophers, Schopenhauer has written a gravely beautiful book on the subject, called Aphorisms on The Good Life; and Santayana might be regarded as to some degree belonging into the same bracket, although he is much more aristocratic and cultivates a prose style that is almost too beautiful for philosophy. An example is his book Scepticism and Animal Faith, full of good humour, gentle sarcasm and much wisdom. As an example of what he is on about: he believes that even an atheist should continue to abide by the Roman Catholic Liturgy, because it is ... well, stately, grand, festive, full of innocent pleasure and promise and, yes, beautiful. But you know: these are mostly the work of elderly thinkers, who've seen much and probably suffered a lot. How much their recommendations may mean to a young person I cannot assess. But if this is how you feel, you could do worse than at least dip into their books.

Your question about virtue, on the other hand, no-one could possible pretend to answer in one paragraph. One might recommend you start with Plato, but which book? I'm inclined to say: all of them. Reading Plato is one of the best ways of killing time known to mankind, so my recommendation is not frivolously intended. The trouble with virtue is, unfortunately, that in our Christian society, it is inevitably bound up with specifically Christian virtues; and accordingly a great deal of what has been written on the subject is tinged with religious/ moral issues. In Rome, where the word originated, 'vir' had quite a different slant on it, cf. "virility", one of its derivatives. And speaking of Plato and his cohort, their word was "arete", which is better translated as "excellence" and carries a semantic of 'social excellence'. So you need to pick your favoured notion of virtue; for there simply isn't just one single meaning to this word.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Oscar asked:

If the reality of the just passed moment is gone, and the reality of the just to be moment, it seems that the only reality is this instant, (and that is gone as we think). Is it possible then that time is not a real dimension rather just a derivative of what we assume when we measure events that are happening or the duration it takes us to traverse a measured distance? Is then distance not the same since both time and distance are measured as derivatives of each other. Just as well, isn't that true for velocity (and the velocity of light).

When we think of it, we believe in the future based on what experiences we had in the past and a projection of what will be in the future. That expectation is what can be referred to as "faith" but there is nothing but statistical collection of past occurrences to lead us to believe an event in the future will ever happen. This question takes us into the realm of things we call constants such as speed of light, gravity, mass, and other "things" we use to measure each other with respect to each other. I think these definitions are derivatives of each other and therefore subject to setting of false and conflicting baselines with self-fulfilling proofs.

Well first of all, the reality of the present isn't an instant... the psychological, experienced present extends into the past through brief and fading memories (retentions), and into the future through equally brief expectations (protentions). Husserl wrote about this quite extensively (Husserl, E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Edited by R. Bernet. Vol. IV, Edmund Husserl: Collected Works. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.). Next... yes, it's quite possible that time is not a "real" dimension... Kant wrote on that (e.g., Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by W.S.T. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996.). We impose, according to him, structure on a reality which we can never directly experience, and our experience of time is part of what we impose on reality... where "impose" does not mean that we create anything external... the imposing we do is in our interpretation of whatever is "out there" which we cannot experience as it "really" is. I'm using all the quotes to emphasize aspects of my little explanation here which are almost totally inadequate, inasmuch as they barely touch on what Kant actually said. But what you're saying about measurement and light is not what underlies this little problem we have with reality. Once you accept measurement, duration, length, you're locked in to the position, basically.

No, that expectation is not "faith", in the usual sense of the word. It is an assumption, or a set of them, that we make, and if you want a thoroughly skeptical take on that one, read David Hume (Dialogues). Also, you need to take a look at a basic book on statistics; you're using that word incorrectly. A "statistical collection" is a kind of sample, and that's not what expectations based on past occurrences are, or are based on... at least, not as you're using the term. Now, as far as your last sentence... no, I'm afraid you're simply wrong here. The question of the interdependence or circularity of these physical dimensions and measurements, has, believe it or not, occurred to others. And great care is taken to avoid this kind of circularity. If you have been taught otherwise, you have been taught incorrectly.

There are a couple of things you need to get clear here. First, you're asking interesting and profound questions. That's good. Second, you are assuming that no one else has asked them, or that the people who have are not very bright. That's bad. Why don't you try another perspective, and assume that those people were as smart as you... maybe sometimes even smarter, and that they put some thought into these issues? And go find what they said about them. I think that you'll be pleasantly surprised, after you begin to understand what they've said... which, actually, is in many cases quite difficult to grasp without a lot of background. Start with the Hume; that's pretty easy and direct, and go from there. Kant, in fact, was at least in part responding to Hume.

Steven Ravett Brown

Yu asked:

Let me ask a question about Godel's Incompleteness Theorem.

Which is stronger, the claim that T is incomplete or the claim that T is undecidable?

Strictly speaking, this is a mathematical and/ or logical issue. But philosophically it is undoubtedly the second, undecidability, which is the stronger or more important outcome. You will recall that Hilbert's programme (like that of Whitehead and Russell) was for a leak-proof set of axioms; that it failed was a minor catastrophe for mathematics, for it showed by the paradoxical means of a rigorous proof that certain logical problem are inherently insoluble (undecidable); and you probably also know that since then Gregory Chaitin has shown with his elephantine 'Diophantine equation' that the whole notion of a rigorous arithmetic can be dissolved in a game of pure chance. For philosophy this is a blessing insofar as the core notion of human agency, which is always under threat when people start tinkering with human substitutes, is thereby placed back in the driver's seat. As Kroneker used to say, "God invented the whole numbers; everything else is the work of man."

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

John asked:

Is eating people wrong? Why?

Yes. Kant had the answer to this one: it is immoral to treat a person as an object. If you eat someone, that's what you're doing. Now, there is an interesting variant on this, however. One could conceive of ritual cannibalism, where one eats the dead to show respect for them to symbolically join with them by taking them into oneself, as moral, because then you're treating them as people, not as food. The ritual cannibalism (yes, "communion") of the Catholic Church is something like this. Is that kind of cannibalism moral? I'm not sure, but it seems that it could be, with suitable respect for the dead. But aside from that kind of cannibalism, using a person as food is denying their humanity.

But, you say, what if you're on a desert island, a ship lost at sea, or whatever, and you and some others are starving... and someone dies. Is it moral to eat them? I'd say yes, myself... I'd want to be eaten in those circumstances, anyway, if it was me that died first. What's the difference between that and, say, donating your organs after you die to medicine, to save lives?

Now there's another kind of cannibalism which I have not really thought through as to its morality, and that's where human beings might clone their own flesh to feed themselves, in some future where food is scarce. Is eating cloned human meat, grown in a vat a) cannibalism, b) immoral? After all, that's nearly what we do now with chickens, commercially. Does it make a difference what the meat is, genetically? My take on this is that it's only our cultural conditioning which makes us feel that this is repulsive and immoral, and that there's not any real immorality there; humans are not treated as objects or as food; there's just meat with human genes. On the other hand, taking human genes and employing them in this fashion, it might be argued, is using the human blueprint, at least, in a way that denigrates it and that opens the door to real abuses. That's certainly a reasonable response, and that's why I don't know the answer to this one... I don't have what I'd consider a decisive reply to it. Which isn't to say there isn't one... maybe there isn't; or perhaps I just haven't thought of it yet.

Anyway, you can see that this is a rather nasty but interesting issue... and quite relevant to today's world, wouldn't you say?

Steven Ravett Brown

My own view that eating people is wrong is based on the idea that it is revolting. It is a human body. This is eating someone: A person. Much as I like people alive, dead bodies have little appeal. My attitude is the same when it comes to meat. Those who eat meat, seem to just think of it as meat. To me it is the flesh of a dead animal, a being, and the longer I have been a vegetarian, the more it seems unhygienic to have dead flesh in the kitchen. It seems perverse to prefer to eat a dead animal to a pizza.

Most people in cities wouldn't eat meat if they had to kill it, skin it and take out the innards and cut it up and cook it. (Of course, the innards are a delicacy, so once taken out, must be put in the fridge for a special occasion). If the animal was a pet, people would have a deeper aversion to eating it. They would especially have an aversion to the killing element.

But a more moderate stance on why eating a person is wrong is because we have ethical relations human beings. Our attitude to humans is different from our attitude to animals. As Raimond Gaita says in The Philosopher's Dog, no-one 'would respond to someone who served up infants in the way they do to someone who serves up animal flesh'. People have a special place in our lives, as do pets. Our respect for persons is shown in the way we bury or cremate them with a religious ceremony. Our respect for pets is beginning to match this. The mass slaughter of animals in England that came with the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease came with no such ceremony. We even have different words: killing and slaughter. Slaughter implies a brutality that is inappropriate between human beings and is only used in the context of war. Our brutality towards animals is something we find acceptable. We do not find it acceptable when it involves humans.

But even if you were to eat a person who died naturally, would you serve the person at a dinner party?

Rachel Browne

Diego asked:

Are all genuine problems scientific? what is left for philosophers to do in a post modern age?

A counter-question: are ANY genuine problems scientific? Once astrophysicists have nailed down the Higgs Field, what's left for them to talk about? — Let me give you a hint you might like to ponder. At this moment, a war is being fought in Iraq. Many people throughout the world disagree with the decision of the US government to wage this war. Is this a problem? Surely it is! But what's it got to do with science?

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Well, your first question itself raises a genuine a problem which does not appear to be scientific. It's clearly not physics or chemistry or anything like that, is it?

It seems likely that only a philosophical answer could deliver a satisfactory response your question. It therefore answers itself to an extent.

It is a point that is often missed that when people say things like "the only important truths are scientific truths" they are not making a scientific statement but a philosophical one.

Such statements are sometimes said to be "pragmatically inconsistent" — i.e their assertion is inconsistent with their being true.

John Sartoris

Espie asked:

What does it mean to say that there is a contingent identity between mental states and brain states?

Larry asked:

Are Works of Art in the mind?

Yes. And to prove this to yourself (and/or to your friends), imagine there were no minds. Where do you suppose a Martian visitor might find a work of art on earth? Whereas if a Martian happened to land today and enquired about the "Night Watch" or the "Moonlight Sonata", you could reply, "they are embodied tokens of something we create with and in our minds; and we put something into these tokens, some clues which our minds pick up, but which do not belong to the objects as objects, and that's why you, as a Martian (they have electron plasma brains) can't see it."

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Bruce asked:

I have become fascinated by paradoxes, almost all philosophical arguments seem to end there! I wonder if anybody out there can suggest some reading matter.

Try Paradoxes from A to Z by Michael Clark Reader in Philosophy at Nottingham University (Routledge 2002).

John Sartoris

How about Paradoxes From A to Z by Michael Clark, and W.V. Quine's, The Ways of Paradox?

Ken Stern

Pete asked:

How could one embrace ethical egoism without also embracing psychological egoism?

Ethical Egoism is an ethical theory that claims that actions are right insofar as they promote a person's own self interest. Under this theory, if one acts out of altruism (does something solely for the sake of another person), this action is wrong. Psychological Egoism is a theory of moral psychology (a theory of mind with respect to actions). It claims that all of our motivations for action are reducible to self-interest. According to this theory, although people might claim to be acting out of altruism, they are mistaken. Their so-called 'altruism' is actually an instance of self-interest. For example, the Psychological Egoist would interpret an act of charity as being a case of a person displaying her personal wealth and power over others less fortunate than she is (This example can be found in Hobbes' Leviathan — Hobbes is a psychological egoist). This act of charity can thus be reduced to an action that promotes an agent's self-interest, and was not really done for the sake of others in need.

As you can see, these two theories are very different. Psychological Egoism, being a theory of moral psychology, is what can be considered an 'error theory' about moral terms (moral language). While we think that moral terms like 'charity', 'generosity' and 'altruism' are words we use to refer to actions that consider the needs of other people, we are mistaken. Ultimately, we only consider the needs of other people insofar as they affect our fundamental self-interest. All our actions, at heart, are self-interested, according to this theory. Ethical Egoism is not a theory of moral psychology. It is a theory that suggests that self-interest is a principle by which we can determine whether actions are right or wrong. Typically, this theory suggests that since every person has one life to live, and this life is of fundamental value, actions that do not promote this fundamental, individual good are wrong. Moreover, trying to promote the self-interest of other people does them an injustice (is paternalistic), since no person can live the life of any other person and know what is truly in their best self-interest.

One can be an Ethical Egoist without falling into Psychological Egoism quite easily because the Ethical Egoist does not deny that people may be motivated by things like concern for the common good, concern for the good of one's family, community or nation, or even pure, saintly altruism. There can be a plurality of things that motivate our actions, but Ethical Egoism tells us that some of these motivations might be irrational, useless or harmful. Unless we employ our understanding that self-interest should guide our actions, we will often do the wrong thing. Unlike Psychological Egoism, Ethical Egoism is not an error theory about the meaning of our moral terms. It may suggest (very strongly) that altruistic actions are wrong, but it does not say that altruism is really, when looked at deeply enough, a self-interested action. The Psychological Egoist might applaud altruistic acts, since she believes that these actions, like ALL the rest, really express self-interest. The Ethical Egoist would not.

Maureen Eckert

Lizzie asked:

What are the ways in which emotion might enhance and/ or undermine reasoning?

I don't think anyone would have the least doubt that emotions do both. When you're on a 'high', things come easily to you, and when you're low, thinking can become an intolerable chore. I suppose your question is not about the mechanism involved, so this leaves us with two 'faculties' that occasionally contend with each other for priority. It also leaves us with two camps of informed opinion, which are probably both right, but have thus far failed to discover a common denominator.

Briefly, the first camp is entrenched in the belief that reason is the 'glory of mankind' and should therefore have priority; in particular, the advocates of this view contend that our emotional life is pretty much the same as for all mammals, at a pinch more subtly responsive, but still pretty crude. A very vocal proponent was the late Arthur Koestler, in his day a bestselling writer on interesting philosophical issues (and therefore sometimes referred to as a philosopher, but that's probably stretching it). At any rate, in his book The Ghost in the Machine he gives an extensive analysis of the troubles which our emotions cause us, who must live and work in societies which exceed in the complexity of their organisation anything encountered elsewhere in the animate realm. In order to give reason a chance, he proposes that conflict situations might be controlled by the administration of some otherwise 'harmless' chemical substances. I suggest that this book, even though it might seem dated, is eminently worth reading and not difficult to follow — after all, it was written with the general public in mind and the issue itself can hardly be said to have made much progress since. I do not suggest that Koestler was ever alone; rather he reflects a very widespread sentiment that emotions can be and usually are the downfall of reason, although he also concedes their value. But altogether he promulgates the notion that we human possess a kind of aggregate of emotional modules, what he calls the inheritance from the croc, the horse and our hominid ancestors, all afflicted with an innate 'wiring defect'. This defect occurred because evolution cannot not dismantle structures once they're in place, but only add to them; and since no designer was around to supervise the wiring, it happened higgledy-piggledy, one on top of the other without any definitive resolution to the hierarchy in charge of dealing with conflicts between emotion and reason.

NB: Another good book on the same subject is The Dragons of Eden by Carl Sagan. I'm deliberately referring you to such semi-popular accounts, for unless you want to get embroiled in neurophysiology, this is where all the relevant information is laid out.

Needless to add, that philosophers on the whole sound the same regretful note about the presumed enmity between emotions and reason. Two notable exceptions are Hume and Schopenhauer; to the first we owe the famous quote, 'reason is the slave of the passions'. But neither one of this pair is really 'on the side' of the emotions. For this you have to go somewhere else.

You would obviously be aware that a lot of potboilers have been written recently with a view to encouraging us to 'let it all hang out', as if there were some especial merit to emoting all over the place. There is neither philosophical nor even any social merit in this and I suppose Koestler would turn in his grave if he knew. Nevertheless, there are serious studies of the virtues of the emotions; and in particular of the indispensability of the 'despised' passions for the health of our reason. For it must be said that, as much as emotions can be analysed down to positively harmful features of our psyche, so reason, when examined closely, turns out to be a very fragile instrument, whose gravest demerit is a kind of 'abstractedness' from life in the raw — in other words, it encourages in us a sort of pristine dedication to truth, love, beauty etc etc which not infrequently gives one the impression of having derived from cloud cuckoo land rather than any place you might find on earth. By the same token, reason which leaves emotion behind is inhuman, and there is plenty of historical evidence to prove this. Emotions and reason, in an ideal case, would keep each other in balance; and one way of looking at this would be to take note of the value structures which we human have erected, which might be said to reflect the good sides of both our emotional and rational faculties.

One book I have already recommended elsewhere in this issue can bear a second push; it is really an outstanding contribution to what we should know about reason and emotion and how our mental health depends on both of them. The book is Antonio Damasio's The Feeling of What Happens. Damasio was (is) a practising psychiatrist and neurologist, and I dare say, what he doesn't know isn't worth knowing. On top he is an exceptionally clear writer, so that I shall leave you in his capable hands it you should feel like pursuing this matter further.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Linda asked:

How can my moral philosophy influence my business decisions?

That's a bit hard to answer when I don't know what your moral philosophy is, if you're looking for something specific. In addition, your question is confusing. I mean, if your moral philosophy tells you not to lie, to cheat, to steal, for example, then doesn't that influence your business decisions in rather obvious ways? Or, alternatively, if your moral philosophy did let you lie, cheat, or steal, then wouldn't your business dealings be radically different than the former alternative? So just what are you asking? Perhaps you are asking something like this: if your moral philosophy tells you that it is better not to lie, then how can you judge when it is the case that it is better, or that it is the case that you can lie to avoid a greater immorality. Is that it? You're asking how to make moral judgments, right? Because otherwise your question is pretty trivial, as you can see.

But that jumps the question into a realm which no one has been able to settle, as far as specifics go; I'm not going to give you any specific examples. But I'll answer your question in general terms. First, you might look at the writings of Singer: there's a philosopher who's not afraid to make judgments, whatever you may think of them. Actually, whether or not I agree with him, I greatly admire him. Why? Because he's doing something that requires great courage, and that most people avoid doing: he's attempting to use his philosophy to make real-world judgments. Make them, justify them, and stick with them, and, as far as I know, he's open to argument and change. After all, if there's any good at all to philosophy, that's what has to be done with it, right? That's why religious figures are admired, also. They have lived according to their moral philosophy (well, a few of them). The problem I have with the latter types is that they are almost uniformly not open to change, and that latter characteristic is, in my opinion, absolutely essential. After all, what if you make a mistake in logic? What if you have misunderstood something, or simply haven't had enough data, or your data has been biased? Then you need to be able to change your decisions, maybe even revise your philosophy... something most saints cannot do.

So, then, what this comes down to is that in order to make making moral judgments part of your life, you have to a) have a fairly clear idea of what your philosophy is, and b) become a saint, bodhisattva, or otherwise uncompromising, but rational (in the best sense of that word) worldly philosopher. A tough row to hoe... but you asked.

Steven Ravett Brown

DT asked:

How do you define one's soul, one's consciousness, one's gut feeling? Is it relative to learned behavior? Does the soul need a physical brain?

The soul is often thought to be immortal and so not dependent upon physical brain. We can imagine that we could exist without embodiment and the possession of a brain, so it is logically possible that soul might not be dependent on brain. But it doesn't seem to be empirically or naturally possible given scientific knowledge these days. These days, atheists think that there could be no mental existence without brain, and it is also thought that the soul is simply a mental capacity, or subjective consciousness. Workers in artificial intelligence seem to believe that they can create consciousness without an organic brain, but the only evidence of this behavioural and physical. Response to external stimuli is no guarantee of soul or consciousness.

I would define the soul as an individual consciousness and this consciousness as subjectivity or internal life. A gut feeling, or instinct, comes very much from within and because it cannot be explained, it is thought to emanate from the unconscious and is not related to reality in the same way as perception or thought is.

Behaviour is learned in the sense that it is dependent upon our interactions with the external world and other people. Behaviour is functional and if a person was simply in a total void, where there was nothing, there would be no cause, reason or motivation towards behaviour.

So, yes, the soul and consciousness are derived from learned behaviour. Gut feelings, even if emanating from the unconscious, are also derived from interactions with others and the environment. Instincts may not be rational insofar as we cannot explain them, but if there had never been interactions with the world and others nothing would become repressed into the unconscious and nothing would give rise to such feelings.

Rachel Browne

Barbara asked:

Do ants have immortal souls? If not how can humans? after all from a distance we may as well be ants too.

We would not, I think, even look like ants from a distance, let alone be ants. After all, we would not appear to have feelers or nipped in waists. But even if we looked like ants, would that mean were were ants?

As for souls, I don't believe ants have souls, but then I am pretty skeptical about whether people have them either. But that is neither because humans are ants nor because ants don't have souls.

Ken Stern

Eric asked:

Returning to what mathematical logic is:

When I say "for all..." or "if ..then..." may I be assuming something that is false?

(I guess there are certain hidden assumptions in the above statements, at the most aggregate level the assumption of space and time.)

May the conclusion that I come up with be wrong as I begin with false assumptions during working with any type of mathematical logic? The question is: Has there been an effort to generate a representation that is free of space, or, time; or both space and time-related assumptions?

Can you recommend me any reference where I can read more about such representations, if they exist of course?

In answer to the first question: yes, of course you can be assuming something false. 'If cows had no tails, then they couldn't swat flies'. A true statement starting with a false assumption, leading to a wrong (but true, given the logic) conclusion.

(In answer to your second question... yes, there are, at least according to some people. Read: Lakoff, G., and R.E. Nez. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.)

In answer to question 3: do false assumptions give wrong conclusions? See1.

4. Yes. But what you're really asking is whether the effort has been successful. Most logicians would consider your question trivial, and answer that of course, any logic is free of those 'assumptions' (a bad term on your part; they aren't assumptions; they're underlying structures). But given what Lakoff and Nunez say, that they are metaphors which are basically built into the way we think, roughly speaking, some cognitive linguists would say that humans cannot escape those structures. Kant would say the same thing.

Read the Lakoff/ Nunez book for an argument that they cannot exist.

Steven Ravett Brown

Jeff asked:

Due to the inherent ambiguity of the term "God", the proposition "God exists" can be either true or false depending exclusively upon the definition of the term. Atheism — to be understood as "without belief in God or gods" — erroneously concludes that the proposition is always false. In fact, if we grant atheism validity, atheism itself would thereby conclude that "God" is to be understood as a conceptual manifestation — and thus existent, if only as a concept. Does this prove that atheism is by definition untenable?

You seem to be playing around the meanings of words used and reaching conclusions based on differing uses of the words. Consider the following argument:

All banks are financial institutions
All rivers have banks
Therefore all rivers have financial institutions.

Now given that each of the premises are true we must logically accept the conclusion. The reason we have however for avoiding the conclusion is that the word 'bank' is used in two different ways. You seem to be making an analogous move with respect to God. Of course the spoken words 'God exists' can be true or false depending on the meaning we give to those words, in some possible world the utterance 'God exists' means 'there are dogs' which in that world is a truth. Clearly and atheist who denied this would be wrong. However whilst the word God may have different meanings depending upon the concept employed of God, each use of it has a specific determinate meaning which can be true or false.

'Atheism — to be understood as "without belief in God or gods" — erroneously concludes that the proposition is always false'

The mistake you make here is to confuse the actual meaning of the word atheism as used and the possible meaning. As illustrated above if 'God' actually means 'dogs' then atheism would be false in not believing in God, but given that the word 'God' has a definite content we can deny God's existence. Atheism doesn't assert that the utterance 'God exists' is necessarily false, rather given the actual meaning of the utterance it is false.

What's more, under your analysis the theist suffers equally. God exists can be true or false and so to assert that God exists erroneously concludes that God exists is always true. Unfortunately I didn't really understand what you meant by your penultimate sentence, if atheism does deny that we have the concept of God then it would seem that it is false; there are however two options here both of which are highly plausible. First the atheist can just say that we don't have a coherent concept of God, it is in fact self contradictory, in a similar way to my concept of a round square. Secondly they can say yes we have the concept of God but so what? Unless we have some sort of Ontological argument which defines God into existence by virtue of having the concept God then the atheist looses nothing.

Mike Lee

Max asked:

Once upon a time all subjects would have been classified as "philosophy" — mathematics — chemistry — psychology — astronomy — physics — and so on were all subjects studies by the "philosopher".

As each discipline became more mature, and developed theories of sufficient complexity and soundness (and may I dare to say became useful) it peeled away from philosophy to become an area of study which stood alone.

Now universities have many many departments set up to study subjects which would once have been a part of philosophy.

Presumably if a new subject area which is presently a part of philosophy becomes strong enough it too will leave the nest.

Philosophy (these days) therefore seems to be the scrap heap of discussions and theories which never really got of the ground. Almost by definition if a subject area develops any real solutions it ceases to be philosophy (like the above examples).

Is it time for the few remaining to jump the sinking ship — or can philosophy still serve a useful purpose?

Your questions are, if I'm well: (1) Is philosophy a sinking ship, and (2) if not what useful purpose does it serve?

To answer your first question:

Partly you answered it yourself. Philosophy is about questions, while the resulting sciences are about answers. As soon as serious research for an answer to a specific question is started, THEN it is not a philosophic question anymore. That doesn't mean every philosophic question results in a science, but that most essential questions start as philosophy.

Now your second question:

An example. Thomas Kuhn introduced the idea paradigm shifts. He was also a physician, but for this science this idea at first was too vague. So he wrote a philosophical work named The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This work is mentioned by sociologists, physicians and philosophers, but it started as philosophy.

So the purpose of philosophy is valuing every new idea, however strange. This habit made it survive in evolution. That doesn't mean be uncritical but unprejudiced. Present postmodern philosophy may seem strange, but possibly hides a useful core. Let them be. Philosophy is about ideas, that preferably contradict or extend the other existing sciences.

BUT if questions in philosophy could be solved by an existing science, than those questions are NOT philosophical, and don't belong in philosophy.

Henk Tuten

Yes, one way to view philosophy is in terms of subject matter, and then (although this is somewhat controversial) I think you're basically correct) one finds that virtually all the sciences, math, etc., were at one point branches of philosophy, and have left and become their own fields as they've become empirically investigated. A somewhat sad comment on philosophy... until you realize two things. One is that it's nice to be in on the birth of a science, isn't it. The other is that we don't know that we've run out of sciences to give birth to... look at what's happening with cognitive science and consciousness right now.

In addition, one might argue that some subject matters will not be empirical; morality, for example. I do not agree with this, by and large, but it's a point, and in addition morality is certainly not empirical yet. Further, what about things like learning how to live together, how to live a happy life, how to be productive and satisfied in the world? It may be that science could give guidelines for this, indeed I think it likely... but that won't be the case for individuals. Each person will have to apply their general thinking to their individual situation, or a combination of that general thinking and science, to live a satisfactory life.

Now, aside from philosophy as subject matter, there's philosophy as process, i.e., as the study of process. What is the best way to learn to think? What should we think about? That is, I very strongly believe that philosophy, done correctly, teaches clear thinking and flexibility better than any specific subject area. In fact I think that this is a prime reason philosophy should be taught in lower-level schools as well as higher-level. And this relates to my paragraph above. If you want to apply your own thinking about morality, how to live a good life, etc., to your own individual life, then don't you want to know how to think these things through, come to conclusions, and apply them? Look at all the mistaken moral systems, utopias, and so forth. So many people jump to conclusions, harbor contradictory ideas... the list of possible process mistakes is enormous.

So, no, the ship isn't sinking, and we shouldn't jump it. We just need to distinguish this particular ship from the others.

Steven Ravett Brown

Rhys asked:

Does consciousness imply a soul?

For example, does artificially created consciousness, which is currently being developed, imply that a soul has also been created?

Would robots also be able to puzzle over whether or not they have a soul in the same way we do?

I am going to be very short with my answer, mainly because this is a subject that crops up time and again and the answer has to be the same every time as well. To take a stand, however, on your three points explicitly: 1. Yes. For a human being, consciousness implies a soul. It is, if you like, the default explanation until someone comes up with something more convincing. 2. I am dubious about artificial consciousness. The whole concept rests on a fundamental error and is (in the end) nothing but a self-deception of the kind we humans tend to fall into from time to time.

Let me therefore acquaint you with two important FACTS: Firstly, that consciousness is known only to occur in (living) organisms. Consequently what we know about consciousness is exclusively derived from the study of organisms known to have consciousness. Secondly: NOBODY knows what consciousness is. Science, which you believe is in process of 'creating' artificial consciousness, does not have a description for consciousness. But science cannot develop anything for which it lacks a description. Accordingly I invite you to entertain from here on a healthy scepticism about such claims and in particular to demand PROOF from any proponent that artificial intelligence is possible at all, viz to demonstrate to you that they fully understand the concept of consciousness. You may then discover (as I did in years of study of the matter) that this so-called consciousness is a far cry from your and mine and everybody else's consciousness. 3. The question about robots answers itself now.

Actually let me add one more comment. Consider for a moment that this endeavour is based on the assumption that we humans with our fancied consciousness and intelligence are just more bits of meaningless matter strung together from the physicist's menagerie. Do you think this is a HEALTHY attitude? Do you think that if all of us were to start thinking that way, that any good reason could be advanced for wanting to preserve the human race?

In a word, I think you might want to start thinking that this attitude does very little for maintaining the self-respect of humans that is absolutely critical (evolutionarily speaking) to our survival. Best of luck!

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Best asked:

1) Suggest two moral maxims which would give rise to contradictory actions. How might the differences between these be resolved?

2) Could it ever be morally right, according to Kant, to torture one person in order to get information which would save the lives of a large group?

3) What place does God have in Kant's moral philosophy?

1) For Kant, the most challenging case that gives rise to two maxims that are contradictory is 'The Case of the Inquiring Murderer.' Imagine that a friend of yours is being chased by a murderer. She comes to your door and tells you about this situation, then proceeds to hide. You know where she hides. A little while later, the murderer comes to your door and asks you where she is. What should you do?

According to Kant, you are rationally bound to uphold the maxim 'Do not lie.' Yet, at the same time, you are also bound to any maxim that prohibits murder or participating in it. It would seem that by telling the truth you would be acting in such a way that ends in the death of another human being. If you lie, you have acted in such a way that undermines truth telling universally, which was Kant's condition for rejecting a maxim.

Kant himself defends the idea that in this difficult case you should not lie. You cannot know the future, all the variables involved, and above all, morality is not a matter of considering the consequences of actions. In choosing to lie, you would be considering the consequences, which is precisely what his moral view (deontology) prohibits as entering into consideration of the moral worth of an action.

Many people have found that, intuitively, they believe they would lie to save someone's life. Deepa Metha's film, 'Earth,' contains a wonderful depiction of this Kantian case (at the very end of the film). It might be worthwhile to take a look at this film and then think about how you feel about the ending and what you believe the right thing to do is.

The solution to this dilemma (a scenario in which both outcomes are unsatisfactory) would be creating a principled way to rank or prioritize moral maxims. That is to say, develop a rule that indicates, for example, that preserving life trumps the maxim against lying. Another possible road to take is to further specify the contents of maxims. This is to say that it may be possible to universalize a maxim, 'If a crazed murderer comes to the door looking to harm someone, lie about his or her whereabouts.' The problem with this sort of solution is that it seems that in any moral situation we might be able to tinker with maxims so that everyone, if they stood in our exact same shoes, would do as we do. In the end, all that does is justify any moral decision we make based on our own case.

2) The answer is no, at least given the way that you've posed the question. The telling words are 'in order to get' that bar moral justification in this case. Utilitarians (consequentialists) could claim that such an act is morally justified, given that they hold the principle of utility: Actions or rules are morally right if they promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. For a deontologist like Kant, consequences cannot be taken into consideration in moral justification. To pose this in a different manner, it is always wrong, according to Kant, to use a human being as a means to an end for any reason. Every human being must be treated as an 'end' in his or her self — a being with the capacity to reason and arrive at their own moral judgments. A Kantian would not be able to morally justify torturing a person to save the lives of others. The only option open is persuading that person that it is wrong to kill others and one is obligated to protect their lives.

3) Although it appears that, through the categorical imperative(s), human beings are able to make moral judgments independently of any given conception of God, when we engage in moral thinking we are not approaching the world as we do scientifically. While the scientist confronts the world in order to gain knowledge of the mechanical (causal) laws at work within it, a physical world devoid of "free will," from a moral point of view we approach the world with respect to moral value. Within this way of conceiving the world, it is not mechanical laws that we try to determine, but the question of right and wrong and of our free will to act in one way or another. From the moral point of view, we encounter the world as a 'kingdom of ends' — a world in which God has created rational beings capable of understanding what is right and wrong and employing free will. Thus, God, who appears to have no place in the scientifically understood world, has a very meaningful place in the world approached from a moral point of view.

Maureen Eckert

Jennifer asked:

I was considering the contradictions with regards to Socrates' Divided Line (specifically that the highest form of knowledge cannot use images to help represent its explanations) and his actual approach to attaining knowledge (that is, through using images, such as the sun which represents the form of the Good as explained in Book VI of the Republic).

My question is this: What was Socrates intent in creating this obvious contradiction within his teachings?

But this is not a contradiction. When one is attaining knowledge, one does not have it, at least in its final or "highest" form, right? Otherwise, why be in the process of attaining it? So then, one's knowledge, while in the state of attaining to the highest form of knowledge, can be in the form of images, even though after one has reached Nirvana or whatever and attained a state of highest knowledge, one's knowledge will not be in images... which, as representations of real or ideal objects, must be imperfect. According to Socrates, as I understand him (Plato, actually), it is only the ultimate objects, the ideal Forms, which are perfect, and those cannot be representations. So one's knowledge, at that point, must not be of reality, one's knowledge must in some sense be reality. Don't ask me how that was actually supposed to work, I have no idea. But that was Plato's take on it.

Steven Ravett Brown

Robert asked:

Today's philosophy suffers..... from arrogance and dismayed insightfulness..... those who have a lot.... have a lot to lose.... those who do not have nothing to lose..... when a philosophical thought can address this demise let me know..... until then..... your thoughts and reflections and your ruminations are destined for the shredder..... philosophical purity is not in the thought..... it is in its service to mankind.

Why such violence? Why the shredder rather than a bin or the trash can?

I think most people who answer here would agree that philosophy should be in service to mankind. But why cannot it not be indulged in for it's own sake without arousing such antagonism?

Rachel Browne

In one thing you are right. The quality and number of publishing philosophers gradually has diminished. Say twenty years ago reading philosophy was more fun. A lot of top philosophers disappeared into sociology, education, physics, mathematics etc. Mainly because this paid significantly better. The result is that a lot of articles in late postmodernism are indeed only worth a good laugh.

But PART of top philosophers always were physicians, mathematicians. Don't tell me that in those sciences quality disappeared.

But the publishing group is only a tip of the iceberg. Underneath things go on as usual. Aren't you happy with a facility like Ask a Philosopher?

There's only one shredder that counts. That's the one of evolution. So I hope in after hundred years or more people will still remember your name. Like all sciences philosophy should serve mankind. If it doesn't, be sure that it will disappear.

Henk Tuten

Nicholas asked:

Person asked:

How many colours are there?

An interesting question. I'll ask you one: what is "a color"? We can say, "I see red" when we look at a red light; but we're not seeing red, really. After all, "red" is a class-name, for a large set of specific colors, right? We are seeing an example, an element, of that class. So what we're doing is seeing a red light, with a very particular exemplar, a token, of the type: red. Ok, fine. So then that particular token is, let us say, "a red". But if we say that, then as you can see there are an infinite number of colors, right?

But let's say that you are asking something like, how many types of colors are there? Now, I could say, with complete seriousness, that there are no colors or types of colors at all, any more than there are numbers "out there" in the world. We construct colors from our processing of wavelengths of radiation, just as we construct numbers by abstracting from the operation of counting. So in one sense of "are", there are no colors at all.

But hey, let's get past that, and take this fairly casually... how many colors are there. Ok, there are three. Well, four, if you count the rods in the eye. We have receptors for (wavelengths corresponding to) red, blue, and yellow. We combine those and make things like orange and purple, but those are complexes of the three primary colors we have receptors for (and in dim light we use the rods which are blue-sensitive as well, but I'm not actually sure that they combine in the same way as the others). So that's another possible answer.

On the other hand, further up in the cortex we do opponent-processing, where red-blue pairs interact with, I think, yellow-green (?)... I'd have to look it up. At any rate there are three of those pairs also. So maybe we see three primary colors and three secondary pair-colors. But then I don't know how many colors there are, because what's a "pair-color"? But that's how we do it. I guess you could say that there are nine colors in that case, perhaps.

But on the other hand, an artist would say I was being an absolute idiot, and that there were millions and millions, maybe an infinite number, of colors... because we can discriminate all sorts of shades of colors. I actually do not know whether anyone has attempted something like changing a color mix by one photon, or by the smallest fraction of a wavelength they could generate in a lab (which is actually quite small) to see if people could see that difference. That would be the test, I guess. Then you'd just multiply, or so you'd think. But the problem with that is that the human visual system doesn't work that way. Sensitivity is dependent on context: the setting you're in; your expectations; what you've last seen; how bright or dim it is; your color sensitivity is extremely variable, just like all your other senses. There are circumstances in which you can see single photons, if the light is dim enough... but you'd never be able to do that in bright light. So... how many colors are there? It depends on where you're seeing them.

Steven Ravett Brown

In English there are eleven colours: Black, white, red, yellow, blue, green, brown, purple, pink, orange and grey. According to George Lakoff (Women, Fire and Dangerous Things) these are the 'focal' or purest categorisations of colours. Sometimes a colour term is contained within the focal category, as scarlet is contained in red.

The numbers of colours identified in a language can vary greatly between languages. However, there are six primary colours black, white, red, yellow, blue and green which are psychologically real even if a people does not name them.

Rachel Browne

How many colours are there?
None whatever. The whole thing is a big mistake. Just ask any bat.

(PS: Someone just recently asked a similar question. So let me refer you to my answer there. Just look for the word "colour".)

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Benjamin asked:

Does God let people get ill to remind them that there is a God?

Benjamin is not the first (or last) person to wonder whether or not the presence of pain in our lives has theological significance. In the 13th Century the Sufi Poet Rumi wrote:

The servant complains to God of pain: in a hundred ways he moans. God says, "But after all, grief and pain have caused you to act rightly and humbly call on Me; complain instead of the bounty that befalls you and takes you far from My door." In reality every enemy of yours is your remedy: he is an elixir, a gift, and one that seeks to win your heart; for you flee from him into solitude
imploring God's help.
— Mathnawi V: 91-95

Version by Camille and Kabir Helminski, Rumi: Jewels of Remembrance Threshold Books, 1996

This kind of question about the theological significance of pain, and any attempt to answer it, qualifies as a version of what is called a 'theodicy.' A theodicy is an account of why God, given that he is considered all good, all powerful (omnipotent) and all knowing (omniscient), allows suffering in this world. Basically, if God is omniscient, then he knows about all the suffering that goes on. If he is all powerful, then he could, at least, prevent some of it. Perhaps, he is not all good? Or is suffering supposed to benefit us somehow? Or is the devil in charge of our suffering, especially senseless evil? If there is a devil responsible for evil and suffering, then how can God be all powerful?

The basic challenge of a theodicy is to show that the existence of suffering and evil in the world does not conflict with the there traditional attributes of God (listed above). A theodicy attempts to show that there is no true conflict.

When assessing this question it is important to distinguish that there are two sorts of evils or causes of suffering: natural evil (earthquakes, diseases, natural disasters...) and moral evil (violence, theft, murder...). Often, it seems easy to say that we human beings are responsible for moral evil and suffering that we ourselves cause. We have free will, supposedly, and could prevent these causes of suffering. God's three powers may not seem very challenged by moral evil. Often, though, certain moral evils, like the holocaust or the torture and murder of a newborn baby, are examples that seem to some people to defy any claims about our making our own choices and being solely responsible for all moral evil When so many people die unjustly under horrendous circumstances not of their own making, it is hard to see why an all powerful and benevolent god would allow an evil event of this scale to happen. Likewise, when an innocent child dies senselessly, it is difficult to see how his or her free will was involved to begin with — why would an all powerful and good God allow a child without any opportunity to become morally responsible to suffer and die senselessly

Natural suffering is also quite difficult to reconcile with our idea of God. We might think, 'Well, if God is so good and powerful, why does he allow as much of it as he does?' When a tidal wave wipes out an entire community, it may seem reasonable to wonder if this isn't over-kill on God's part. Why not simply destroy peoples' property instead of drowning everyone? Some may find the answer here to lie in our fall from the Garden of Eden; we ourselves chose to reject the original paradise we were given. The world since then is a difficult place. Yet, others find that in cases of natural evil, God seems to act randomly. Natural disasters do not seem to be caused by the evil deeds of those affected by them. The more we have learned about the world, about the causes of earthquakes, tidal waves and diseases, the less inclined we have become to blame themselves for these occurrences. If God is a master-planner, these evils seem like flaws in his design.

The philosopher John Hicks has one of my own personal favorite answers. He calls the world a place of "soul making." The idea is that our souls, if we get them, are made through our experiences in this world and our responses to our experiences. Hidden in this concept is an interesting challenge to the idea that we all are born with souls, ready-made. Ultimately, this idea, in my view, places God at a great distance from us, and perhaps this answer would be unacceptable to those who wish to maintain a strong notion of a personal god who possess the three qualities he is traditionally considered to have.

An excellent documentary film on this subject is called 'Questioning Faith.' The documentary follows the explorations of a divinity student who wishes to understand why God allowed his dearest friend to become ill and die. I highly recommend this film, which explores the question of why God allows suffering in the world from diverse points of views, different religions, including atheism as well.

Maureen Eckert

Imagine a world where God has allowed just as much evil as necessary to the mix to make souls achieve the best they can possibly achieve. However, in this imagined world, where ethics is practised to the highest degree, no-one has ever conceived of the existence of a 'God'. In other words, I am describing a humanist paradise, where everyone lives in blissful ignorance of the author of their being. In these circumstances, would any theodicy be able to justify the introduction of additional pain and suffering, not to make us morally better — because we have already achieved the highest that it is possible to morally achieve — but simply to "remind us that there is a God"? That is what your question seems to be getting at. And your thought is: "Surely that would not be the action of a benevolent being but a despot, whose only concern was to force his subjects to bend in submission?"

Geoffrey Klempner

Kate asked:

How and why does consciousness arise from the jumbled up mass of neurons which exist in my brain?

How? If anyone here could answer that, they'd be up for the Nobel. No one knows. But.. neurons are not "a jumbled-up mass". Not at all, the brain is extremely well-organized, on both small and large scales. Consciousness arises from some sort of structural factors, it seems. But we do not know how or which ones.

Why? Well at least we can take a stab at this one. Consider the "lower" animals, i.e., animals with smaller brains, down to animals with no nervous systems at all. What do you find, in terms of their thinking, inasmuch as we can determine that, and in terms of their behavior? You find less and less flexibility, less ability to adapt and change, less ability to break habits. And when you finally get down to very low animals and plants, you find none, pretty much, except on evolutionary time-scales (which isn't what we're talking about here). So then what is the function of consciousness, i.e., why does it arise? Well, there you are; that seems to be the answer to that one. There's an interesting breaking-point in behavior; interesting to me, at any rate. Consider the animals who play. What are the lowest (for lack of a better term) animals who play, when they're young? Well, fish never play (I don't mean dolphins or whales, etc.; they're animals). Plants never play. Reptiles never play, not as far as we can tell. I mean, as soon as a fish or reptile hatches, they are adults, basically... small, but they won't ever change. But take some birds, like crows, or dogs, or cats... etc... when they're young, and to a certain extent even as adults, they play with things. It's almost symbolic behavior, isn't it... a bit of cloth or string or whatever becomes something else: not what it really is, as a piece of string. Well, I think that's the point where we see the first bit of consciousness. Play is a very flexible way of seeing and manipulating the world, much more than just seeing it as it is. But this is just my own private hypothesis, with very little to back it up; I'm just giving it here because it relates to your question.

Steven Ravett Brown

I don't know HOW, but I'm pretty sure IN WHAT WAY.

I guess that somewhere in evolution it became profitable to distinguish yourself from others. Why attack yourself?, that makes no reason. Imagine yourself sharks biting in their own tail. Of course there are other ways to prevent that. But in this way by evolution the trait of recognizing your own body became 'seen' as positive. In the same way recognizing your own thoughts as connected to this body got useful for humans and some apes. These were the first because these creatures needed communication to survive. So in their case it was extra useful.

How this was realized is another question.

Henk Tuten

We first have to prove that it does!! We could reverse the question and ask: How does consciousness in the form of mind manage to manipulate the neurons in the brain to perform the actions that they carry out? If I wish to raise my arm the action follows the thought, not the other way around, the thought does not arise from the action of the neurons. Also, it is difficult to envisage how mechanical neurons can make decisions: I think that most of us entertain the belief that the neurons carry out the decisions made by the mind. When we put a probe in the brain does the electrical crackle we hear follow the thought or precede it? In my experience it seems to be the former, though I concede that the speed at which the system works makes it very difficult to observe.

Another way to think about it, is that sensory neurons stimulate sensations in the brain/ mind informing us about our environment. The sensation received when we touch something is not at the end of the finger but in the sensory cortex of the brain. We can respond to or ignore the message received, this is a conscious decision from information received. In fact, philosophically, we can say that our world is in our mind, as this is where all sensory information is received and interpreted. When we respond to sensory information the decisions we make are carried out by motor neurons which move the necessary parts of the body, if in danger we run or stand and fight, the choice is made by the mind and the neurons carry it out. There is one circuit however that informs the mind/brain after it has carried out the action, this is called a reflex; when we touch something very hot we jerk the finger away automatically, the feeling of pain arrives in the brain shortly after. Reflexes are circuits in the neuro-system designed to protect us; in the case of heat, if the message arrived in the brain first for the mind to make a decision about moving the finger away from the heat, the digit would be very badly damaged and perhaps lost. Again, in the reflex there is no thought arising from the neuron, it is an automatic mechanical action, the thought comes after when we say: "Ooh!! That hurt!, and decide to tell the neurons to stick the finger under the cold water tap.

There is obviously much more to say on this, the philosophy of mind is a massive subject within which philosophers and scientists disagree widely. However, I may have said enough to indicate that your question is a common presumption and that the neurons seem to be the slaves of the mind rather than the other way round. Recent advances in neuro-science now indicate that the brain is more like a large gland, where hormones have a massive influence, rather than just dry electric circuits. This complicates the issue even more, but whether we consider either dry or wet conditions in the brain, the mind seems to be the boss, rather than the worker. However as I have indicated, there are many other points of view.

John Brandon

Edward asked:

This isn't really a philosophical question as such, but rather a question about reading philosophy. Recently I was advised not to apply to read philosophy at university because I achieved a low mark in an abstract reasoning test i.e. my ability to discern trends and patterns in shapes was poor. My teacher did, however, add that my mark may have been dependent on poor spatial reasoning (as the test involved shapes) which is not necessarily required for philosophical study. Do you think such tests are a guide to potential philosophical aptitude?

Secondly, do you think logic can be improved with practice?

There's no black and white answer to this. There seems to be such a thing as "general intelligence", but it's hard to pin down. Specialized tests such as the one you cite tend to relate to one's general intelligence and to each other, but that's just a tendency, not anything written in stone. Do I think they're a guide? Yes, in general. But I cannot answer that question, and no one can, in any particular case. There are also specific abilities which are realized in specific brain areas, and visualizing is not realized in completely the same areas, generally, as verbal abilities. There's overlap, of course.

You want advice? Go for what you're interested in. If you like philosophy, read it. Maybe you'll have more trouble with it than some others, maybe you won't. But you'll be enjoying yourself, in any case.

There is absolutely no doubt that one's ability to reason logically can be improved with practice. But in addition, with very intense practice and time put in, one's aptitude can also be increased. That is, with great effort you can increase your intelligence, even in some fundamental sense... up to a limit, of course... which no one can determine beforehand. interactions between motivation and intelligence are strange and complex.

Steven Ravett Brown

I am strongly against using any form of intelligence or mental ability test in order to measure 'philosophical aptitude'. To begin with, I would challenge the justification for the belief that if you do well on test XYZ you will perform better as a philosopher (unless the test is a philosophy test — even then, I have my doubts).

If the designer of the test has reasoned a priori that marks in the test will be correlated with philosophical performance, then this claim is open to refutation by an empirical study of actual case histories of philosophy students who have taken the test, and their subsequent careers. (The point that such a priori assumptions in psychological testing are open to empirical refutation was repeatedly made by the psychologist Hans Eysenck.) Have any such extended studies been made in the case of tests for philosophical aptitude? I very much doubt it.

But let us suppose that good performance the test has been shown empirically to correlate generally with success in philosophy. There will always be exceptions to any empirical correlation. Even if ninety-five per cent of people who score badly in the test do significantly worse in philosophy, you may be one of the five per cent who succeeds spectacularly against the odds, because of other factors such as motivation, or other intellectual skills which compensate for lack of skill in the narrow area tested.

Ignore your teacher. If you have decided that philosophy is something you really want to do — and I am assuming that you know what philosophy is about, and are not merely guessing that you might like it — then that counts for far more than performance on any test.

Yes, the ability to solve logic puzzles, diagnose logical fallacies, write proofs in formal logic can all be improved with practice. But that will have positive benefits for any academic subject — not just philosophy — that requires you to argue a case.

Geoffrey Klempner

Mack asked:

In a report to the United Nations on February 14, 2003 International Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei said, "We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq."

To take another example, a documents which Iraq provided suggested to us that some 1,000 tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for and/ were destroyed, and Hans Blix, Chief Weapons Inspector said, "We [the United Nation and United States] must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

How can Iraq PROVE IT DOESN'T HAVE weapons of mass destruction?

Isn't that "trying to prove a negative"?

This is a complex question and requires a complex answer. It is not up to Iraq to 'prove the negative', but rather up the UN Inspectors to prove the 'positive', i.e. that Iraq is in possession of WMDs. To this point in the two reports Hans Blix has delivered to the UN Security Council the case 'have not proved the existence of WMDs'. Thus, as it stands at the moment, Iraq has not been found to be in 'material breach.' Thus, the negative is not proved because the positive has not been proved. The key to this question lies in the understanding of UN Security Council Resolution 14.41. UNSCR 14.41 was a political manipulation by the right-wing hawks of the American administration, and by the injudicious support of that Administration by elements of the British Government. It was a resolution which did not initially receive the backing of the American Administration who wished to initiate military hostilities immediately. However, the resolution serves as a legitimisation of a strategy of the 'hawks' who are concerned that the Weapons Inspectors have not proved the positive. The strategy was two fold: the Weapons Inspectors would deliver the report of Iraq non-compliance (which has not yet happened) and the 'hawks' in the meantime, would prepare for military hostilities though massive build up of men/ women and the machinery of war.

UNSCR 14.41 is an International agreement which comprises of a multi-level approach to this serious issue. Both the American administration and the British Government has signed up to 14.41 as the method of determination as to what action should follow, if Iraq is found to be in 'material breach'. It also states that non-compliance and 'material breach' will bring with it 'serious consequences' but it does not state what those serious consequences are. That is for the International community to decide, but the hawks have already pre-empted the decision of the International Community and made it clear that 'serious consequences' means pre-emptive military hostilities. But, as yet, no case has been proved. Since it is a resolution of the UN, both America and Britain have signed up to the multi-level, multi-strategic approach and should they act outside the confines of the terms of the resolution they will be in contravention of International Law and the UN Charter on human rights.

So, the negative does not need to be proved, the positive does. Only then in the proving of the positive can the International community decide which course of action should be undertaken. It is also not outside the bounds of possibility that the 'hawks' of the American Administration are disappointed that the UN Weapons Inspectors have not, as yet, declared Iraq in material breach. Attempts to introduce emotive issues to the Americans (a connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda) are futile since resolution 14.41 makes no mention of this, and this connection most certainly has not been proved, indeed, as Colin Powell found out, is dismissed by the intelligence agencies. Consequently, there is no internationally legal justification for a pre-emptive military strike, nor is there a moral case for military hostilities under the terms of UNSCR 14.41. The case must first be proved. To date, it has not been and therefore the case of proving the negative does not exist — the UN Inspectorate is seeking to determine whether Iraq does have WMDs, not whether they do not. Thus, a war is neither morally or ethically justified. It may be commercially justified (the ensuring of the constant flow of oil for the Western/ American financial markets) but that is markedly different from the moral case. Prove the positive before determining the negative.

Fr Seamus Mulholland OFM

Looking at an argument's logical form, i.e. considering the structure of an argument without the content you can prove a negative. Consider:

If A occurs then B occurs.
B does not occur.
Therefore A does not occur.

We have proved a negative here, that is, that it is not the case that A occurs. Now to reintroduce content to bring it back to Iraq, consider:

1. If Iraq has WMD then it will leave evidence of them.
2. There is no evidence of them.
3. Therefore it is not the case that Iraq has WMD.

Now I'm not asserting that any of the propositions are true merely that if they were true then you could reach the negative conclusion.

Considering the issue from an epistemological perspective instead of a logical one. Now it seems that we have two hypothesis to consider:

Either, 4. Iraq has WMD
Or, 5. It is not the case that Iraq has WMD.

Now to prove 4 all we need is one example of a WMD to prove it, whereas to prove' 5 we would need to rule the possibility of WMD being anywhere at all. Fortunately our standards of proof never require us to have absolute certainty regarding a proposition. Even to prove 4 beyond any doubt we would need to rule out any possibility at all of doubt which, thanks to sceptical arguments, we never can do (at least with respect to factual knowledge). So if we accept that we don't need to be absolutely certain of the truth a proposition we can see that we can prove a negative proposition. If all we need is to be beyond reasonable doubt, then it is a case of weighing up the probability of Iraq having WMD given the evidence we have.

Now the final issue remaining is that of a person who wishes to hold on to proposition 4 come what may, (perhaps as pretext to military action!). If the weapons inspectors say there is no evidence of 4 all that person need say is that they haven't proved it, perhaps because the Iraqis are so sneaky and clever that they can hide them perfectly. The problem is that the two people are using the word 'prove' in different ways.

To conclude if we demand that proof be absolutely certain in order to accept a proposition then it is unlikely that we can ever prove that Iraq has no WMD, but then by the same standards we can never prove absolutely that they do.

Mike Lee

Some 'doubts' have application in the real world, while others exist only in philosophers' fertile imaginations.

If Hans Blix finds what appears to be a nuclear warhead, and all the scientific tests confirm that it is a nuclear warhead, then only an idiot would say, 'Ah well, but it could be a cleverly engineered illusion, or a dream'. Yes, there is a logical possibility that we are living in a Matrix-world, and all our beliefs about the world around us are false. But no-one would ever consider modifying their actions to take account of that 'possibility' — unless of course evidence that this world is a Matrix-world were to appear.

On the other hand, if the most thorough searches have not revealed a nuclear warhead, if all the Iraqi nuclear scientists have passed lie detector tests etc. etc. then it still does not require a science fiction scenario to imagine that hidden away in some cave or abandoned mind somewhere is an arsenal of nuclear warheads. No-one can be that certain.

So, the question remains, How certain do we need to be? How high is the standard of 'probable proof' to be set? Probability is relative to evidence. But you need to have enough evidence to make your calculation, otherwise you're just guessing. I think that this is a case where there is no rational way to assess probability, at least, not without a far more thorough search than any that has been undertaken to date.

Geoffrey Klempner

Carrie asked:

Do you think Socrates feels that philosophy adds meaning to life for everyone? Or does it only apply to certain people? How?

In Plato's Apology, Socrates defends himself against his accusers claiming that he is on a divinely inspired mission. "I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise" (Ap.23b) In the dialogues, we find Socrates speaking with a variety of interlocutors, ranging from famous Sophists (Gorgias, Protagoras), Philosophers (Parmenides) friends both young and old (Meno, Crito) and other Athenian figures (Euthyphro, Laches). He was regularly found in the Lyceum and agora, public places where he came into contact with citizens and strangers, even going to at least one Symposium (drinking party) held by Agathon in the company of the playwrights of his day, along with Alcibiades. Plato's Socrates seems to interact with a great deal of people and is willing to engage them in philosophical conversations. When they are not well versed in philosophy, he helps them as best he can grasp the questions he asks. He does appear to think that the unexamined life is not worth living with respect to everyone. Yet this may (controversially) mean that every person can benefit by coming to understand their epistemic limitations — to know that they truly do not know.

Whether everyone Socrates conversed with were able to benefit from philosophy in the way he hoped is unclear. Euthyphro, for instance, runs away at the end of his dialogue with Socrates. And Socrates admits in the Apology that his practice of philosophical questioning has made him many enemies among the politicians, poets, and craftsmen. It may be an open question as to who can benefit from philosophy. In Plato's Republic, the picture of education painted there is quite different, and very few people would have the capacity to rise to the heights of philosophical dialectic after ten long years of practicing mathematics. Only a few would end up as "Philosopher Kings." Many view these ideas as reflecting Plato's own view, which contrasts with his portrayal of Socrates. It seems clear that Socrates had a following, and by philosophizing in public, became the target of the public's wrath. Plato founded the Academy, and taught philosophy under more selective conditions, perhaps benefiting far fewer citizens than his teacher had.

Maureen Eckert

Mike asked:

I am an interested amateur philosopher, working in commerce as a business consultant. I see a great need for discussion of and application of higher ethical standards in business. I also think that the majority of business decision makers would benefit from the introduction of some philosophical thinking into their training and ongoing personal development. I further think that they would enjoy it and it would encourage them to help us make a better world.

The continuing existence of this vacuum leads me to conclude that most philosophers are too introspective or too involved in exchanging erudite opinions and speculations with their colleagues and not enough concerned with how their thinking could be applied in the real world to real world problems.

Are there philosophers who are engaging with working people to demonstrate how exciting philosophy can be, and how it can be applied with advantage to personal and strategic issues in the business world?

Well, let's take it from the top. First, of course, as a philosopher, I completely agree with your first paragraph. And there are courses in medical ethics, business ethics, philosophy of education, and so forth, in virtually all our universities.

Second, what vacuum? You merely state that people would benefit from this. I assume you're implying that they don't have it, and that it is the fault of philosophers that they don't. A strange assumption, to my way of thinking. Lets see... how would I go about educating 'business decision makers'? Publishing a journal in ethics? No... that's being done. Writing about ethics in newspapers... being done. Courses in ethics... being done. How about this: ethics courses and seminars in businesses! Great idea. Who's going to pay for this...? The business leaders who need the ethical lessons. Right. Whoops... we seem to have hit a snag here, haven't we. First, they won't pay. Second, even if they do pay, do you actually think that a few seminars are going to change their minds? I guess I'm more cynical than I thought... because I certainly don't think so.

So the solution seems to be to have ethical education in high school and before that. Well, that's a nice idea... and who's going to pay for that? Look around you; what's happening to money for education? Yes. Ok... philosophers should just volunteer their time, since there are so many of them and they're so overpaid anyway, to teach in the schools...? Not a bad idea either, except that to teach you need certification, etc... all of which takes time, costs money... and that time and money are taken from doing philosophy, which, believe it or not, is actually quite difficult.

We seem to have some problems here, don't we. First, money. People won't pay for philosophers to teach them; they don't see philosophy as necessary, as you do, to your credit. There are very few jobs for philosophers, and they are not in industry nor in public high schools. Not as philosophers. Second, what would happen, do you think, if a philosopher, teaching in a lower-level school, would start explicitly teaching ethics? They'd be thrown out by a pack of indignant parents and educators, wouldn't they. Especially if they taught anything resembling modern, humanist ethics. We don't live in a secular society, not here in the States, at any rate. Just look at what's happened with teaching evolution, which has so much evidence backing it up that... well. I won't even go there.

Mike also asked:

I have spent most of my working life in the marketing and general management sides of commercial business. Along with most of my colleagues and competitors I have seen the marketplace as a battleground, on which you strive your utmost to win business at the expense of your competitors. If a competitor goes to the wall, or is weak enough to be taken over, so much the better, if the result is less competition.

A free market and tough competition stimulates innovation and progress (at least in material terms). It also fosters unethical behaviour and lack of consideration for one's fellow man, particularly if they work for the competition. Despite that, man does not yet seem to have come up with a better way of advancing the (material) well being and freedom of the majority, in any large community.

Is there a fundamentally different and better way for man to move ahead, that will temper his aggressive, selfish instincts with greater altruism?

It sounds as if you're going through an ethical crisis. Good for you. There are many answers that have been given to your question... the field of utopian ideas is a moderately large one in philosophy. Plato, in fact, was one of the first, in the West, to attempt a utopian community. It failed, eventually. It seems that on a small scale, practically anything can work, for a time. On a large scale, and over long periods of time, the longest-lasting systems, as far as I am aware, have been those in which nearly absolute power is concentrated in a small class of people, usually ruler-priests (I'm thinking of Egypt, China, India, the Mid-East, the Aztecs, the Mayans, Japan, the Catholic Church, for example). The combination of military and religious power is one that works on multiple levels of the human condition, as you might imagine. I do not think that capitalism, in your sense of the term, has been around long enough to test it, really... a couple of hundred years, maybe... not very long compared to these other systems. Is it better than those? Oh, dear... "better"? Surely you see the problems there?

But let's say, for the sake of argument, that your criteria are the correct ones: altruism as opposed to selfishness; empathy or peacefulness as opposed to aggression; material well-being for the many; freedom for the many. You realize that it is not universally accepted that all these are "good"... just because you and I do is not any sort of justification... just because our societies do is not either. But I will not go into arguments attempting to justify them, I'll just accept them for the purpose of this discussion. Now, given that, we ask your question above. There are no answers, I'm afraid. Oh, certainly, if you read Marx, for example, the thrust of his whole system is just exactly to maximize these values. But Marxism has been attempted several times in the last century, on large scales, with uniform lack of success. There are many who advocate universal Buddhism... and perhaps they have the best case; all in all, that is a philosophy which has pretty much stood the test of time; and it does more-or-less embrace the above values. But it is not, insofar as I am aware, an economic system... sort of the opposite, in effect; a renunciation of economics and the importance of "material well-being". I have no idea how it could be worked out as an economic system, and so far as I know it has never been. But that might be something for you to look into; in all other ways it seems an admirable life-style, especially, in my opinion, if you do not embrace it's religious/ metaphysical underpinnings (rebirth, karma, etc.). There are of course the various religious communities... but first, they are not (with one exception that I know of — Mormonism) well-worked out economic systems, and second, they are small-scale, and dependent, really, on being embedded in larger societies. Thus we could mention the idyllic life-styles of monks, of the Amish, and so forth.... The Mormons seem to be an exception to this. But they are, as far as I can tell, actually a prime example of a social group similar to the older societies above: the virtually absolute rule of a powerful priesthood, very much like Muslim societies seem to be, for the most part. And those societies, while they pay lip service to "the majority", in actuality provide freedom and wealth proportionally to one's status in the ruler-priest class.

So, where does that leave us? In flux, I'm afraid. You can certainly go to any bookstore and pull down innumerable books on how best to live, how our society should be shaped, governed... how we should live as individuals, blah, blah, blah. But one must first justify such conceptions with data and logic, then test them, then implement them. We have, at this point, still insufficient data on how human beings function. What data we do have, has not been put together into a coherent system relating to coordinating human activities: a "society" maximizing the above values. And third, that putative system, once formulated, must, as with all hypotheses, be tested empirically... at what human cost, who knows? Then finally, that system, successfully formulated, then tested, must be implemented. Good luck. History is littered with the failures of such attempts. But... how else can we proceed?

Steven Ravett Brown

If you are speaking of the entirely and absolutely "free market", I would say that I have not the perception that this is "the better way of advancing the (material) well being and freedom of the majority, in any large community".

>From what I have seen, well being and freedom are more advanced in communities where free enterprise is tempered by clever (and enforced) regulations and established solidarity.

Concerning the question in your last paragraph, it all depends on what you mean by "moving ahead".

Jean Nakos

Robert asked:

Philosophers throughout history have always been quintessence of what we would refer to as student. They sometimes are influenced by other minds when forming a philosophical opinion. Plato might have been influenced by the Buddha or Confucius, Jesus by so called prophets, Mohammed by Jesus and the Torah and so on and so on. It's like a philosophical pyramid. It perplexes me when so many "students of philosophy" can have totally different views on a single issue.

Hence my question.....has there been any study as to how philosophy can be detrimental to the harmony of this planet? It seems to me that any new philosophical thought can alter the status quo and be disruptive among this species. Couple that thought with the present political and economic climate around the world, philosophy seems to be outright dangerous. Western...middle eastern and eastern cultures dictate a philosophy that is suited for that part of the world. It seems to me philosophy has lost its purity as a science or even as a discipline. May I have your views on this?

I suspect you will get more than one answer to your question; and it occurred to me that possibly one slightly 'offbeat' way of responding would be to invite you to ponder the presuppositions to which your questions gives voice.

For example: "The harmony of this planet." Are you sure there is such a thing? Isn't harmony a human concept? Of course it is; and when you use the phrase "harmony of the earth", you probably mean some kind of balance between us and nature that is not destructive to either. But perhaps you might entertain the possibility that this supposed harmony is also a human prejudice — an extremely rare manifestation in the real world and therefore all the more desired and hoped for. For to begin with, harmony implies disharmony; it implies disparate elements coming together and producing a concordance of co-existence. But altogether there is more conflict in the world, much more: and this could positively invite you to consider whether those 'conflict situations' to which you allude with such worry may, in fact, comprise the preconditions of harmony? I put it to you as a debating point that the concept of 'harmony' which is promoted by so many thinkers has an element of sterility about it. Harmony is not a natural state of being and the complexity which, for example, rules life would collapse to an inert state not much different from the 'peace' enjoyed by a rock if harmony were the default condition.

So I'm suggesting to you that you put a perspective on your beliefs. Harmony tends to be a 'loaded' term, often accepted without examination as to what it purports; and thus "the present political and economic climate", which seems disastrously unbalanced to you, strikes you as a dangerous problem; but you need do no more than dip into any history book to find the sages of every age and culture saying the same thing. There is an old adage, whose source I can't remember now, but its meaning was effectively: we strive throughout our lives mightily to achieve a secure basis for our peace, happiness and contentment, and one day, in our dotage, we achieve it and find little satisfaction in it. It is then, when we look back upon the course of our struggles, that we realise that our true happiness and contentment were in the doing, not in the relaxing, and that the very meaning of it all revolved around this question-and-answer game with society, nature, our own inner strivings and the perpetual need to create-and-resolve conflict situations.

In other words, I'm really giving the question back to you with a counter-question: is harmony perhaps something greater than ourselves, a phenomenon that works itself out through conflict over long stretches of time, but with the telos of earth persistently in the balance: and we are too small and unaware, that our conflicts are in the service of the greater "harmony of this planet." After all, allowing for a moment that harmony equates with eco-balance; it is a pretty plain conclusion that if we humans manage to untip this balance sufficiently, we'll go down. The earth will not support a rapacious creature like homo sapiens for long if our greed enters the stage of runaway calamity: for if we deplete the resources available to other life forms, we do the same to ours.

Finally you wonder whether philosophy has lost its purity. I hope you realise, even from the little I've just said, that this is again a terribly prejudicial notion. Philosophy is not a "something" made of material with changing degrees of purity. It is a human pursuit, and philosophy is exactly as 'pure' or otherwise, as the person pursuing it. Philosophy is about reason, knowledge and truth, and all these must change as we go along, not because we are 'losing' harmony or purity, but because harmony in the human domain is a dynamic state of interplay between minds and amenable to growth. There have been eras in the history of mankind where just one philosophy prevailed, and few would go along with the suggestion that these eras were notable either for their peace and harmony or especially conducive to the maintenance of human values. So the best hope for us, I think, is that the disharmony which you perceive is 'value-driven' and will allow something good to come out of it. And this is a play in which you too, have a role to play.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Jack asked:

I am not exactly sure how to state this so I will try to cite an example first.

When shooting pool sometime I miss an easy shoot and it totally baffles me. Afterwards, thinking about the whole game I will determine that it was not the correct shot to "win" the game. I believe that my subconscious was fighting so much to get through to my brain that it distracted me so much that I missed the easy shoot.

I think this happens in real life as to cause some major mistakes, due to this inner turmoil. You might think you really had some insight and go ahead and do what you where going to do. When in reality what you did was completely wrong and you never realized it, of course, till it was after the fact.

Are there any psychology studies on this philosophy and/ or what it might be called so I could do some research on it?

There are so many reasons we make mistakes that I can't possibly even begin to go into them. One mistake you are making is trying to account for mistakes through one overriding class of causes. But mistakes are caused by many classes of causes. For example, your pool shot. Here's one possibility: suppose that as you're lining up to make this shot, you start thinking about how you might miss the shot. Well, in order to do that, you have, to some extent to rehearse missing the shot. In other words, thinking about a movement activates the motor areas, to some extent, responsible for that movement. So to make a shot, to walk steadily, to ride a bike, to ski, to play ping-pong, you need to think about making the shot, etc., and not about how you might miss it. Then you will be rehearsing the correct motion, by thinking about it. This accounts for some degree of some people's clumsiness and accident-proneness, I believe. My theory is that they are literally constantly practicing how to drop things, how to stumble, etc., by thinking about doing those things. And since they practice so much, they get good at doing them. Mind you, this is my personal theory; I have no idea as to whether it is actually true... but the neurological basis for it is there.

Another way we make mistakes is, as you speculate, by interference with other tasks or other sensory images: "distractions". Also, if we try to do several things at once, because we have limited capacities, we cannot devote as much to any one, and will tend to lose concentration and make mistakes.

Another way we make mistakes is by coming to the wrong conclusion about something and following through on that conclusion. But there's no reason that this has to be due to "inner turmoil"; you might be perfectly calm and still conclude that, say, Echinacea is an effective cold remedy, or that crystals give one psychic powers, or that decks of cards or tea leaves will reveal the future. There are people who believe these things, and many more, despite overwhelming evidence against them.

There are many other causes of mistakes. Perceptual illusions, conceptual limitations... by the way, this is not a philosophy. These things come under both psychology and philosophy, and there are so many categories here that I don't even know where to refer you.

Here are some readings:

 Piattelli-Palmarini, M. "Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Reason Rule Our Minds." New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994.
 Rozenblit, L., and F. Keil. "The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth." Cognitive Science 26 (2002): 521-562.
 Piaget, J. Insights and Illusions of Philosophy. Translated by W. Mays. New York, NY: The World Publishing Co., 1971.
 Damasio, A.R. Descartes' Error; Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York, NY: Avon Books, 1994.
 Schwartz, B.L., D.M. Travis, A.M. Castro, and S. M. Smith. "The Phenomenology of Real and Illusory Tip-or-the-Tongue States." Memory & Cognition 28, no. 1 (2000): 18-27.
 Boyer, P. "Natural Epistemology or Evolved Metaphysics? Developmental Evidence for Early-Developed, Intuitive, Category-Specific, Incomplete, and Stubborn Metaphysical Presumptions." Philosophical Psychology 13, no. 3 (2000): 277-297.
 Hines, T. Pseudoscience and the Paranormal: A Critical Examination of the Evidence. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988.
 Schick, T., Jr., and L. Vaughn. How to Think About Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1995.
 Shermer, M. Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time. New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1997.

Steven Ravett Brown

Carrie asked:

I am a philosophy student at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Just recently I discovered your website, and found it to be very informative...so maybe you could help me out. :)

I have two questions (1) "What does perception make us aware of?" and (2) "Are there sense data?"

I'll answer No. 2 first, because it is easily disposed of. The term 'sense data' is only a facon de parler (manner of speaking), which is convenient to us today because we are habituated through I.T. to refer by this term to unformed packets of potential information. But our senses do not respond to 'data'; the way they are calibrated or sensitized implies a prior selectiveness, a mode of screening unwanted impressions, so that the 'data' which actually impinge on the nervous system are more accurately termed sensa, to distinguish them from all other data which may strike our senses, but are not registered for one reason or another.

No. 1 is more difficult to handle, because it embroils us in theories of the mind and brain. The term 'perception' implies an evaluation, or judgement, performed by the nervous system, the brain, the mind, or all three of them to varying degrees. Thus to perceive dangerous heat, you need nerves, but not necessarily a brain; to perceive a stalking predator you need a brain, but not necessarily a mind. Finally to perceive a sound uttered by another human being, you need a mind to transform that percept into a meaning unit.

So perception makes us aware of meaningful conditions in our environment. Over long stretches of evolutionary passage, organisms in their habitat developed what might be called a delicate and quite subtle symbiosis of 'give and take'. The environment is given, but changeable; organisms respond to and in turn influence its shape. In the strict context of your question, however, the best way of understanding what this give and take amounts is this: that sensa on the whole reflect those circumstances which are of instantaneous importance to an organism and that accordingly the senses are tuned to pre-process impressions relevant each to their modality, whereas perception performs the evaluation by synthesizing them. From this you will understand that sensa are immediate, without an appreciable time lag between an impingement and feeling it, whereas perception, owing to its greater complexity, may lag at times considerably behind.

I have left out of my answer the one criterion that perhaps is the real focus of your question. What does perception mean in human terms? But this cannot be addressed quickly and easily, and in any case there are many conflicting theories, which I could hardly ignore or attempt to reconcile with each other. The best advice I can give you, therefore, is to read a relatively small, but very informative and lightly written book which presupposes no prior study: A History of the Mind by Nicholas Humphrey. The context of your question is well covered in it and I think you will find it rewarding reading.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Joshua asked:

In tackling my Phil107 class I came upon an essay on the mind body problem, more specifically, the beetle in the box. How is the beetle in the box problem of mental expressions related to the cartesian dualist view? How can the cartesian dualist respond. I'm not asking you to write my essay, merely a pointer in the right direction would be helpful.

The beetle in the box argument is just one of several arguments that comprise what has become known as the Private Language Argument(s). Very roughly put the Cartesian view would appear to assume that it is possible to doubt and discount all knowledge of "the external world", "other minds", etc... yet at the same time retain the ability to talk sensibly about the self (the famous Cartesian Cogito) and its "mental" states & experiences — pain, happiness, intentions, beliefs, etc, and sensations (of colour, hot/cold, sounds, smells, etc...) because they are conceived to be somehow mental and therefore "directly accessible" to the conscious soul and indubitable. The Cartesian then sees his task as "rationally reconstructing" and providing secure "foundations" for all knowledge from this basis of the Cogito and its world of mental experiences alone. So the Cartesian, having discounted all "externals", assumes he can still meaningfully talk about his experiences of seeing red, feeling hot, being in pain, being happy, thinking something, etc., BECAUSE he believes (or just assumes) that he can explain the meaning of these words by reference (a sort of pointing inwardly) to his own private mental samples of red, pain, happiness, thoughts, etc.. which he assumes are immediately present, simply "given", within his conscious mind or soul.

Now the private language arguments as a whole undermine this conception and its underlying assumption of a dualism between two distinct realms — an "inner", mental world of the soul (or mind) and an "external" world of tables and chairs and other people. They do this by arguing that the inner world of the cogito and its alleged "mental objects" provide no basis whatsoever for the concepts of experience, sensations, mental states, etc. that the Cartesian assumes he has a right to use. The beetle in the box argument is just one of these and has the a very specific objective of pointing out that:

IF (1) language is to be used as a means of public communication AND (2) key terms (e.g. "beetle") are assumed to get their meaning only by way of reference to a logically private mental sample, that only I can "see", locked within my "box" — the Cartesian inner world of the mind and its "representations", THEN (3) the private mental sample (the beetle or thing in my box) ends up being irrelevant to whatever public meaning our use of the concept ("beetle" or whatever) might or might not have.

One possible response for the Cartesian is to say: — OK then, I forgo the public communication aspect and just regard my use of these words as part of a private language all of my own. I will accept some form of scepticism as regards the possibility of communication with other people, either simply accept it and live with it (possibly even terminating in a form of solipsism), or reckon on resolving or explaining it away by some other means, later. But I can still lay claim to my own private language about "beetles", "red", "pain", "happiness", etc... ...

It is the purpose of the other bits of the private language arguments to disabuse the Cartesian, and his later heirs, of the belief that this is an option. ... and, of course, I am assuming that you have read the relevant sections of the Philosophical Investigations, namely paras 243-314.

Another possible response of the defender of the Cartesian conception is to try to argue that the beetle in the box and other "private language" arguments are either (1) viciously circular ... relying on hidden premises that are equivalent to what the arguments allegedly purport to "prove" or (2) rely on other hidden premises or presuppositions that are, for some reason, unacceptable... you might want to try to think what these might be yourself but we can leave them for another time,... get a hold of the basic arguments first.

Rob de Villiers

Mae asked:

Did ancient Greece's grandeur disappear? Why are Greeks of today not as influential as before? What are the reasons for Greece's mediocrity today?

The first consideration is that the Greeks today are not 'mediocrities', unless you are willing to classify all humans as mediocrities except that tiny handful who have made outstanding creative contributions. Such views as your question puts forward are often expressed from a point of view of modern western civilisation's accomplishments. But even if I were to grant your point, on the assumption that once upon a time the Greeks were a race of brilliantly creative people who later 'lost the plot', a simple answer would be that ever since the 'takeover' by the Romans, Greece has been the site of numerous invasions, as a result of which their racial mix has changed completely, so that today's Greeks have little more in common with the ancient Greeks than their political name. Now this historical fact should give you a second lever by which to query whether there is any relevance to the question as you've put it. The comparison between then and now, because its rests on an assumption of identity between the people occupying Greek terrain formerly and today, is not valid.

Thirdly, and finally, the terms of your argument can easily be extended to many other cultures, which had their day and would not feel happy at being singled out as mediocrities because they have fallen off from a peak of achievement which is so rarely granted to any group of people. The China of today is not what it was in Marco Polo's day; and his own Venice is not what it has been. Samarkand was once the glory of the world, what of it now? Ditto with Rome, Florence, Nineveh, Memphis, Granada etc etc. — In sum, "Grandeur" is an exceptional state of generally short duration; therefore let us bless Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory, that we have them as examples of those pinnacles to which the human race is capable of ascending, even if so far we have not discovered the secret of making it last.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

According to the German historian and politician Jacob Phillipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861) "the Greeks of the present say are of Albanian and Slav descent with hardly a drop of true Greek blood in their veins." Fallmerayer's view was adopted by the Nazis and used in order to justify the exterminationist policies inflicted upon the Greek population during the WWII German occupation of Greece.. The same view is sometimes expressed today for political purposes. However, anthropology, ethnology and linguistics have shown that the population of Greece is basically native and that the contemporary Greeks are descendents of the ancient Greeks.

History answers your question. All influential nations have their rise and their fall. Greeks are not the exception. Their influence lasted long (until 1453 — the fall of Constantinople) but their fall was quite hard. They were occupied by the Turks (Ottoman Empire) and this occupation lasted, more or less, 450 years! They won their independence in 1831. During the World War II they won the first victory for the allied camp (1940 — against the Italians). Today they are a small nation of 17 million people (10 million in Greece and 7 million abroad). But still they are more influential than many small nations. Greece is an old and full member of the European Union, of Nato and of the OECD). Currently, Greece holds the rotating presidency of the European Union.

... And Greece is still a superpower in poetry! Two of her poets, Elytis and Seferis won the Nobel prize and she had at least ten other poets of the same class and stature (Cavafy, Ritsos, Sikelianos, Palamas, Calvos, Solomos, Kariotakis, Valaoritis, Drosinis, Malakasis and others).

Jean Nakos

Kurt asked:

This maybe a very convoluted question...earth is in a solar system, our solar system is in a galaxy, our galaxy is one of many galaxies contained within a very large universe. What is that universe filling? and if god (be it man/ woman or both or neither) made all of this who are god's parents and who are their parents etc?

Your metaphysics have led you immediately into, what is called in philosophy, an infinite regress. To make any progress this line of questioning will have to be abandoned. The range of empirical statements you make up to "universe" can be dealt with by the sciences of astronomy, physics and mathematics. The problems arise when your sequence enters into the metaphysics of space, time and God; problems that philosophy has battled with since ancient times.

Deducing from your knowledge of the empirical world, you have fallen into the trap of making God in the image of man, hence God requires parents, and so on. The absurdity of this line of reasoning becomes obvious when you require to house, clothe and nourish God, to say nothing of his involvement in sexual activity!! Even religion does not make such claims. Taking the religious line that God is a 'spirit,' although I have only a hazy notion of what this means, I can tolerate it because it seems to have possibilities beyond what I understand. However, being a physiologist I know more about humans than most people, and to propose that God is a human would be a self-revealing absurdity.

You have actually touched on the frustrating problem of origins, a problem which defeats science and opens up a range of difficult to prove philosophical and religious theories. Both physics and biology are held suspect simply because they have had to invent their own ideas of origins, the Big Bang in the case of physics, and the accidental formation of proteins in mud pools in the case of biological origins. Neither of them to my mind is very convincing. Even when we put aside the origins and start half-way up the ladder, as both physics and biology do, to say that there is such a thing as an evolutionary process which depends on a sequence of fortuitous accidents seems on the face of it an absurd proposition. As for the Big Bang, where did the first primaeval atom come from? Unfortunately science is tied to the matter myth and all its theories are blinkered by this. Whereas philosophy can offer a range of possibilities beyond the paralysing confines of alleged material reality. Scientists are not mystics and they will always seek to explain strange phenomena in terms of empirical/ material solutions. They are reluctant to admit that answers can be obtained from anything other than naive reality, and if answers to phenomenal events cannot be produced, they are simply suspended in the confident belief that there will eventually be a 'natural' solution to the event, whatever that means.

You ask what the universe is filling, again, there is something here to do with naive reality in your concept. Stated simply you seem to be making the suggestion that there is a vast amount of matter which has to be contained in something, a bit like a gas filling a spherical flask. The question is asking: What is the flask like? What is the flask made of to be able to contain all this matter and restrict its expansion? Again, such a question is based on empirical evidence drawn from everyday experience. The problem does not seem to be about containers, but space and time, or space-time as we now understand it. Events in the universe occur within space-time, not within some mysterious container. Space limits the universe within three dimensions. An event is identified by a 'world point' in a four dimensional continuum. The four points are, three points of space and one of time.

Given that science has had to admit that when we try to study material reality by reduction, i.e. looking at smaller and smaller constituents, we enter a reality very different to the common concept, away goes cause and effect and we find ourselves in a universe of random events, an unpredictable world of quantum events where matter seems to pass in and out of existence. MATTER?!! Whatever am I talking about.

John Brandon

Francisco asked:

To where it influences the logic in the explanation of the historical facts?

This one has been around for quite a while... and it's so ungrammatical that I'm not sure it is possible to understand. But I think that after seeing it over and over, I finally get it.

What you want, I believe, is a beginning text on hermeneutics, the study of interpretation. How does logic influence the interpretation of history? There are those who might claim that it has very little influence, and they write about how viewpoint basis such interpretations: hermeneutics... a field which began in the Middle Ages with the interpretation of religious texts.

But hermeneutics is not my field, and I do not know a good beginning text in it... all that comes to mind is Gadamer, who is not for beginners. In addition, given your problems with English, I would strongly advise you to find a text in your native language (Spanish?), and I have no idea as to Spanish writings in hermeneutics.

So, good hunting!

Steven Ravett Brown

Kirsty asked:

Do humans actually exist or are we part of the imagination of some greater being? Do we imagine each other?

I used to ask questions just like this myself, when I was a lot younger. I studied astronomy and particle physics and began to wonder about the truly inconceivable disparity between the greatest and the smallest; but even between an atom and a quark there is such a huge gap that a living thing living on an atom still would not know that there are quarks around! And I started thinking, what if we are nothing other than the denizens of one of these billions of quarks that might make a millionth of a gram of matter, how could we possibly know? And then, perhaps, all those enormous structures in the universe might just be more quarks; and all this, the whole universe together, just one atom!

Well, even today, when my interest has shifted to biology, I am staggered by thoughts not unlike this. When you consider that a human being begins as just one tiny microscopic cell and ends up being a collection of 6,000,000,000 of them, don't you just ask yourself, how can these things live and not know what they're doing? I'm sure they do, the same as we 'know' what we're doing; and if a galactic visitor looked at us from a few billion miles away, he or she (or it?) would probably think we're just an ant heap anyway, rambling around in our transport vehicles this way and that way, without any obvious purpose whatever.

Can I give you an answer? Heavens no! Not even to the second question, "Do we just imagine each other?" No-one can be absolutely sure that we are real; the best we can do is rely on instruments that can't be cheated as easily as we can; and so if some detector device registers the presence of smoke, well, then you know there's a fire somewhere close by. The trouble is, that scientific devices and apparatus can't be calibrated to register all those things that are really important to us — in a word, science cannot answer, truly answer, your question. So that leaves the two of us dreaming away, imagining we're having a conversation via the Internet, whereas what we're really up to might be starting up some plasma-wave generator in the dimension we can't see, where some super-being has just won the Nobel Prize for discovering internetty plasma-waves as a new law of nature....

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

The main problem here is the use of the terms 'exist' and 'imagination.' I believe that I understand what you mean, and I appreciate the limits that language imposes on philosophical discussion. Imagination is used here not quite in the sense that we understand it in everyday life.

The great 18th century philosopher, David Hume, referred to the sense data we receive, along with our passions and emotions, as 'impressions.' The faint images of these he called 'ideas.' Imagination, then, arises from combinations of the simple ideas derived from received sense data. Hume pointed out what we are all aware of, that sense data, i e our everyday experiences are more vivid than things imagined or things arising in the mind from stored memories. These latter are mere shadows of what we call sense impressions.

It is necessary to be aware of the above before entering into the metaphysical view posed by your questions. If there is a great power capable of producing all things within its own 'mind,' and if this is indeed the nature of the universe, then this would be the only 'reality' in 'existence'. The world would be 'mind stuff,' this would of necessity include humans. However, it seems that this great power would have to impose laws on such a creation, 'natural laws' we might call them. Human minds would be individual minds within the great universal mind. Controlled by the laws, all humans would seemingly be guided into a general recognition of things in the way the great power required. Thus, if it was required that all humans should recognise, or believe in, a material existence, then so be it. Each human would recognise other humans, and would come to understand what was meant by 'life' and 'independence,' we would all 'exist' within this 'reality.' As we would all be products of this super power, then such a power could impose anything it chose on the world, including 'free will' for humans: or, if it wished to keep control then our lives would be 'determined.'

Alternatively, if this super power was capable of producing 'actual' 'matter.' then it might create a 'material' world; everything, including humans, would be 'real' in the solid sense, real 'material' objects. It seems that this is the way you are using the term 'real' in your question. The implication being that things can only be real if they are out there in the world as solid objects. As we have considered another way in which things can be real as 'mind stuff' the fallacy in your question is revealed. You are using a pre-conceived idea of reality derived from what philosophers call a 'naive' view of the world. This view is to some extent held by materialist philosophers and probably most scientists. But there are some philosophers called 'idealists' who take the view that reality is mind stuff controlled by abstract laws. In fact some philosophers, both materialist and idealist consider the abstract laws of mathematics, space and time, etc. to be more real than what are called material and mind stuff objects. Some of these are called 'rationalists,' who believe that things can be discovered about the real world, not only by direct perception, but by rationalising, cogitating (thinking) about things.

Your second question by implication hints at 'solipsism,' the view that only oneself exists. Although a seemingly absurd proposition, it is still debated by philosophers. I wonder if it is a comfort to the solipsist to believe that he/she cannot really die, they just stop imagining, and it is the world that actually dies?!

John Brandon

Kev asked:

Does poverty diminish human dignity?

Please send me some web site I could search.

I'm sorry but I don't know a web site on this; I'm sure others will give you one. But here are some thoughts for you. First, are you clear on what 'dignity' means? Does it mean, for example, doing only what you consider ethical, i.e., not compromising your ideals? Does it mean being treated respectfully by others? Does it mean doing what you want to do in life? Does it mean not being in anyone else's power, or must you have power over others to have dignity? Does it mean not becoming upset by circumstances? You can see that there are many possible meanings for that term, and I'm sure you can think of others. But in order to answer your question fully, you need to have clearly in mind what you mean.

Here's one possible viewpoint on this question. There are several possible ways to support oneself. One can be dependent on others for their support. One can inherit enough wealth to support oneself without working. One can work for a living, doing something that one enjoys (and/or finds meaningful and I'm not going to try to analyze that here). One can work doing something that one does not enjoy or that one is indifferent to, and find enjoyable activities outside of work. Within that latter choice, one can work as little as possible at jobs one does not enjoy, be poor, and spend the rest of their time doing what they do enjoy; or one can work a 'normal' or greater than normal amount, either hoping that effort will enable them to eventually do something they enjoy or not caring.

The first alternative may or may not retain dignity, depending on how one is dependent, what one does or does not do, what is expected of one... and so forth. Usually, but not always, being dependent seems to lessen 'dignity', however. Alternative two does not usually lessen dignity because wealth confers automatic status, deserved or not, a human peculiarity... and status makes a person believe, at any rate, that they have retained their dignity. Alternative three is perhaps the best of all... and few attain it.

Some people choose alternative four... but since wealth confers status and poverty does not, any poor person is seen by some, at any rate, as having less dignity. Whether this should be true is another question, isn't it. However, poverty, given that one spends their time doing what one enjoys and feels is meaningful, does not, it seems to me, lessen dignity at all. Alternative five is one where a person hopes to attain wealth or a job that they enjoy, and sacrifices for it. Not unreasonable, given even a slim chance that this might happen, and usually people perceived as doing this are perceived as having dignity. The last alternative, where people work at something they do not find meaningful and have no expectations of changing that, but do something enjoyable and meaningful outside of work, seems to be the lot of much of humankind. As long as there is something meaningful in one's life that one actively pursues, one is seen as having some dignity. The last alternative, then, is one where there is no enjoyment of one's work and in addition no feeling outside of it that one can do anything meaningful. Much of humankind lives like this also. How many are in this state and how many in the previous is one of those horrible questions that many people try to avoid facing, because the last alternative is a life with very little dignity.

So in answer to your question, poverty makes dignity less likely. Now the next job of analysis here would be to look closely at 'enjoyment' and see what kinds involve dignity and which do not. I'm not going to do that, except to point out that there is quite a bit of literature on a life lived, say, for sensual pleasure versus a life lived for, say, intellectual pleasure.

Now the above analysis is, in essence, a kind of economic one. We might also do a power-oriented one... where, instead of one's work providing the means of support, perhaps one's work provides power over others. Usually the two are related, but not always. Does increasing power increase one's dignity? It does seem that powerful people are understood, by and large, as having dignity. Thus we see that dignity is not necessarily associated with being good or moral, since it is extremely difficult for one to have power and retain one's morality... as history shows. And so we must ask whether dignity is actually desirable in itself, or if other characteristics, which lead to dignity, are the desirable ones... while yet others which lead to dignity are not desirable. You might think about that.

Steven Ravett Brown

Billy asked:

What were Eriugena's comparisons on his different modes of theology: Affirmative, Negative, and Superlative?

When we use an expression like "God is [whatever]", we are making comparisons with created nature. So to say, "God is wisdom [truth, goodness, beauty etc.]" is to make use of an affirmative notion, as if God were somehow comparable to whatever notions we hold concerning wisdom, goodness, etc. But these notions are not compatible with a Being that is not created, but infinite, omniscient and the cause of all created things; accordingly such expression can never be more than metaphors . Therefore, although it sounds paradoxical, it would be more appropriate to say, "God is not wisdom (etc)", i.e. the negative mode, so as to leave God unenclosed in our created realm and to acknowledge that a mere word, "wisdom (etc.)" is incapable of embracing an infinitude of predicates. Erigena, who inherited most of this theology from such predecessors as the Pseudo-Dionysius and Neoplatonists, then went on to examine whether adding the prefix "super" to our concepts of wisdom (etc.) would occasion more than just a grammatical change. Since 'super' means 'beyond', it could be argued that this usage meets both desiderata, e.g. to leave God's autonomy untouched while retaining the convenience of talking about God's attributes in humanly intelligible terms.

For Erigena the crucial point in this debate is affirmative and negative senses are in essence just verbal devices, both constrained by the experience we can have of wisdom (etc); accordingly the superlative predication can be distinguished from both affirmative and negative mode in that the copula "is" has, strictly speaking, no content — "super-wisdom" is not something conceivable to us. Yet in its grammatical form, a statement like "God is super-wisdom" it is still of the affirmative variety. But, Erigena counters, in its meaning it swings over to the negative, so that we are effectively negating the positive denotation of the statement.

Erigena concludes in the end that the superlative usage effectively reconciles the affirmative and negative senses and that something important may be learnt from this exercise in dialectics. What we can learn is that God is, for "to be" is for God indicative of a transcendental state which is beyond relation; and consequently what we cannot learn about God from our logical and verbal finessing is what God is, for this would require us to set him into a relation to what we already know.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Judi asked:

Does listening to music while working help you to study better?

No. There are many many studies in the field of attention relating to distractors, divided attention, switching attention, and so forth. A huge literature, in fact. And ALL of it, without exception, shows that dividing one's attention lessens the ability to learn. There's no ambiguity here. It doesn't help. Period.

Steven Ravett Brown

There are some opinions which affirm this and others which deny it. Then there are some views which claim that baby needs Mozart and that hens will lay better eggs if music is piped into their pens. Like all opinions, these are always backed up by solid proof — a reminder that if you attack a problem from the right angle and use the right technology, you can prove anything you like.

All the same, there is something to be said for the influence of music as a background while you are consciously focusing on some other matter. Like the colours and shapes, and smells and noises which surround you, music has some effect on the state of your psyche. In particular music is apt to produce moods; but what kind of mood does not depend on the music or your will. It's totally up to chance; and that's why measuring harmonies or frequencies is an idle pursuit. Our bodies do not react to frequencies, but to the forms in which music is cast, which address a mind; and these forms are analogues of emotions which you may pick up in 'background listening mode'. Then you are being, subconsciously, influenced.

Having made this more or less objective comment, I'll add my personal opinion, which is that music making and listening is a spiritual experience. Since this is my view, I cannot but feel that music, which is capable of connecting us with or inducing in our psyche a transcendental state, is debased when used for mere background noise; and therefore I also happen to believe that the 'piped music syndrome' is one of the great disasters of social living. So many people's psychic state is being deformed daily on account of this, it is gone beyond a sick joke; and the most amazing part of it is that so few people resist this blatant manipulation of their inner states. I can see it coming that before much longer all these millions of people, who are completely unaware of being subjects of mood manipulation, will fall for another trick of conditioning, except maybe something more directly malevolent. I have wondered for a long time now why there is no resistance, and I have half a mind to ask you, in view of your question, whether you ever feel annoyed or put out or distracted by the hundreds of loudspeakers you have to pass every day, and if it ever occurred to you to complain?

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Grant asked:

I am working on a conceptual framework to guide practice in an adult education institution for all academic aspects of the institution (design, delivery, assessment, student services, etc.)

Are there certain essential elements that should go into a conceptual framework to make it valid and reliable, and hence useful to inform practice?

Why is the one basic "conceptual framework" that you have, namely your mother tongue, not sufficient to do what you want to do — which would appear to be to design courses, define methods and policies of delivery, assessment, student support, etc.? Why do you seem to feel the need for a new or additional "conceptual framework", i.e. a new/extended language, to do this?

Concepts are not "valid" or "invalid" reliable or unreliable, they are just more or less useful, and many philosophers have questioned the usefulness of the very notion of a "conceptual framework" itself. Certainly the idea that one might be able to pre-define the essential elements that any "conceptual framework" should have to ensure "validity" and "reliability", strikes me as pie-in-the-sky.

Why can't you just use the English language (which provides a pretty rich source of concepts!) to clarify, define and state your institution's objectives and policies — and use this general understanding of what you are about to guide and inform particular issues of practice? Or is your problem that you simply do not know what your institutional objectives and policies are, or that there are deep and fundamental disagreements between members within you institution as to what they should be? If either of these is the case I very much doubt that shopping about for, or trying to construct a new "conceptual framework" will solve your problem. Although, of course there will be any number of vendors happy to sell you their favoured "philosophies", theories, ideologies, &Co. No "conceptual framework" will provide you or your institution with an automatic guarantee that your thinking, decisions and methods are "valid" or "reliable" ... or relieve you of the task making your own decisions about what you believe in and value or what it is right to do.

I just find your question so strange ... Do you conceive of us and our institutions as somehow like pieces of inert computer hardware that require the installation of software — programming languages and operating systems ("conceptual framework", the "right" language) to work, "correctly"? ... weird... a strangely and deeply de-humanising idea, I would have thought ... but no doubt I completely misunderstand you...

Rob de Villiers

Sudarmaji asked:

Did you know how frustrated it is to be in the position of teaching philosophy to first-year students? I bet you did. The problem is: Is there any tip to teach philosophy for students that recognizes this art of living as a "beyond of everyday life", especially, never getting used to being comfortable and enjoying life? The worst is that he/ she who loves philosophy lives in a "strange world" — out of norms, eccentric and "beyond the ideal figure".

Malang, Indonesia

Here's my take on your question. You are living in a Far Eastern society, one in which population density is very high and in which conformity is valued very highly. It is probably what is termed a 'shame' rather than a 'guilt' culture, where moral rules, customs, and so forth are enforced by group pressure, rather than by internal pressure. Am I correct? In the West, the culture is guilt-based, i.e., one's actions are largely internally guided. There is value attached to nonconformity in this culture, sometimes quite high, depending on context. Artists and philosophers are taken for granted as eccentrics, for the most part, and are valued for that quality. Given that, you see that your question is not one with which a Westerner would consider central to being a philosopher, and certainly not the 'worst' of it. To a Westerner, the 'strange world' of the philosopher is a small deviation from the normal one, and it is very hard for us to understand and appreciate what is behind your question. I do not know how to answer it, because I do not know how eccentrics in your culture cope with the status of 'outsider', which in Western culture is an accepted role. I can refer you to an interesting book, The Lotus and the Robot by A. Koestler, a Westerner's viewpoint on India's and Japan's cultures. I have no idea as to whether there are writings in your or similar cultures about this dilemma; I do not know your literature. But those topics: the outsider, shame versus guilt cultures, and similar ideas are where I believe you should look.

Steven Ravett Brown

Doe asked:

What part did religion play in Athenian achievements during the golden age?

A very significant part. In fact, it played a greater part in their society than religion plays in ours, and they had their daily round of observances and sacrifices, their weekly services, their monthly and annual festivals the same as we do, except they believed in them. This is the sort of thing we tend nowadays simply to forget: but consider that the tragedies which we call 'plays' or 'dramas' were part of Athenian liturgical festivals, that a great deal of their sculpture, which is 'art' to us, comprised offerings to the gods; and so on. There is no scarcity of books on this subject, but if you want just a short overview, an article in the Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut, will help you get a clearer perspective on this important matter (and its obvious influence on Platonic philosophy).

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Casibjorn asked:

In metaphysics anything can exist, beyond the human senses and mind yet all maybe subject to more questions and doubt. Based on Aristotle's metaphysics as the reference point for my inquiry on the subject of extraterrestrial life and intelligence, I would like to ask the question of its validity.

Adding to that, if it still OK, based on the philosophical eras from ancient to the contemporary, I would like to know each era's point of view on the same subject.

Metaphysical means per definition everything outside (formal) physics. Because physics is about sensory experiences, this could indeed mean non-sensory. But in practice the common sense meaning of metaphysical became non-rational experiences. That could mean involving senses that are not yet accepted. It even in theory includes on earth unknown senses of extraterrestrial beings.

Puva asked:

What is the impact of superstitious beliefs on mental health?

It depends on what you mean by "superstitious beliefs", doesn't it. But take a look at this book:

Harrington, A., ed. The Placebo Effect: An Interdisciplinary Exploration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

It is an exploration of the reality of the placebo effect, which seems to happen about 1/3 of the time... although there is controversy about this. There was a recent study, either Danish or Norwegian, I forget which (sorry for lack of reference), which seemed to indicate much lower frequency than that. At any rate, one interesting correspondence is that about 1/3 of people can be reasonably easily hypnotized. Kihlstrom has done work in the latter area, e.g.,

Kihlstrom, J. F. "The Cognitive Unconscious." Science 237 (1987): 1445-1452, and many others.

See also:

Farthing, G. W. The Psychology of Consciousness. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1992 for information on hypnosis.

Now, why am I talking about placebos and hypnosis in the context of superstition? That's pretty obvious, isn't it. If you consider that the means of effect of superstitions are at least partly through these processes, then we're starting to understand how to get a reasonably clear handle on them. In addition, relating to the origins of superstitious beliefs, you might look at: Frazer, J.G. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Third ed. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1951; and Eliade, M. The Sacred and the Profane. Translated by W.R. Trask, The Cloister Library. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1961.

Steven Ravett Brown

Lindsay asked:

I just want to know that if there is no 'me' in this world, where do my mentality and my feelings go?

There are several possible answers to this, but whether any of them are credible to you depends very much on what you choose to believe. You may take the hints I'm about to give you as an incitement to follow up with some research of your own; there are few things more important than this if you have the slightest inclination to keep prodding things for an answer to their enigma!

First, then, there is the quasi-scientific view, according to which the neurosystem, over several stages in your growth, 'switches on' the various neurophysiological modules that give you a sense of selfhood. When you die, these modules, the source of the energy by which you, your mentality and your feelings are maintained, are 'switched off' and all your mentality is extinguished. The body's matter falls apart, having reverted to the dead-matter state; but whether the psychic product of their work, while alive, has the capacity to survive is answered in the negative by science and in the affirmative by religion. But neither knows .

Secondly, there us the view which forms the basis of Schopenhauer's philosophy. What I've just called 'psychic energy' is, according to him, a pervasive force in the universe. It is everywhere, but formless: mere potential (echoes of Aristotle). This force becomes attached to matter and gives it form as well as the power to act — something like electromagnetic gravity which we suppose to inhere in every clump of matter. It also becomes attached to biological substances and accommodates itself to their special nature. Organisms, being living things, on acquiring this force, find themselves endowed with the will to live and to assert themselves. The more complex organisms, in particular those with a nervous system and a brain, absorb more of this force and then it manifests itself as a manifold of psychic strands, apt to generate the illusion of individuality and personality — but (Schopenhauer maintains), it is still just the one will, that one pervasive force of which a fraction is alive in us. Because he was a passionate (!) atheist, he doesn't have much to say about this will that is good and comes down heavily on the side of those moralists who have always preached that selfhood is the source of all evil in the world, even though he castigates them too, for their nave belief in God as the source of the human will. His whole philosophy is a kind of negative imprint of Leibnitz's conception of this world as the best of all possible worlds, for Schopenhauer doesn't mince words about regarding the products of the will as the cause of the worst of all possible worlds!

Between these two, together with religions, the matter has been pretty well carved up; and in the last 20-odd years, there has been a huge spate of books devoted to brains and minds. But it would be too sanguine to believe that we've made any real progress on answering something as apparently simple as your question. All that can reasonable be said in view of our limited knowledge of mentality, is this: it appears to be the outcome (emergent property) of the complex organisation of neurons in the brain. Not their quantity, but the way they are interconnected. In other primates which are occasionally proposed as also having a mind, this appears not to be the case. This complexity and its emergent property depend in turn on the sensitivity of the neurons themselves; for although to a microscopic view they all look the same, studies in embryology have shown at least that neurons differ among each other as much as all living creatures do. This again is an evolved trait, for evidently the 'program' for the manufacture and connection of these neurons is transmitted through the generations by their genetic encryption. where your mentality and feelings disappear to when you die can only be guessed at. It is probably not so much an unanswerable as a wrong type of question, because it assumes that the notion of a 'self', of 'mentality' and of 'feelings' identify something 'real'. But they may identify something that is simply 'being', i.e. a state or phase of the universe which is not attached to objects like humans, but generated by them.

To put it into a somewhat far-fetched metaphor: a picture by Rembrandt can be used as (a) bits of canvas and timber suitable for burning on a cold winter's night; (b) a memento of once living people, who lacking cameras had no other recourse to perpetuating their image than a painter's brush and skill, (c) as a resource in, say, a computer data base, of imagery suitable for all manner of occasions, (d) as part of the 'autobiography' of western civilisation, (e) as the spiritual record of a man and his era, the painter laying down in coloured images whatever concept of visual truth he wished to communicate. Now the sense of (d) and (e) in my metaphor is just the sort of criterion that cannot be quantitively evaluated, it depends crucially on there being some mentality in the world which is expressed in and capable of being deciphered from the clues in those pictures. But to a visitor from Mars, (a) might be the only criterion to apply to it. What this implies is, that human mentality is not a possession 'for keeps' or some force creeping into our skin from another dimension, but a force inside us which, owing to certain special conditions prevailing, is transformed from its neutral phase of animal consciousness into a specific 'force' of selfhood, emotional awareness, cognitive consciousness etc. Here is 'being', but not 'existence', more or less as Heidegger taught. The 'you' in the creative act is, literally, self-created. Necessarily it must go when your body dies. But it lies as a potential in every human being born, so although your specific selfhood and mentality must die along with you, yet there is (partial) continuity of even yourself in the fact that half of your genes go into any baby you procreate.

But this is where I must leave you to it, though I hope that something in this answer might induce you to pursue the topic on your own. It is probably the single most fascinating course of study there is!

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Then it isn't because it is something seen that it is seen, but the opposite: because it is seen, it is something seen. Nor is it because it is something led is it led; rather, because it is led, it is something led. Nor because it is something carried is it carried; rather, because it is carried, it is something carried. Isn't it quite clear, Euthyphro, what I wish to say? I wish to say that if something comes to be something or is affected, it isn't because it is something coming to be that it comes to be, but because it comes to be, is it something coming to be; because it is affected, it is something affected.

From Plato's Euthyphro 53C

I'll say a bit on this. Plato is talking about the difference between, let us say, external and internal, or extrinsic and intrinsic, causes or changes. Or, to put it another way, between contingent and essential properties. We could take a triangle, for example. Triangles must have three sides, and the only things with three sides are triangles. So in that case, we can say: because it is something with three sides, it is a triangle. We can also say: because it is a triangle, it has three sides.

But carrying a book, say, is not something intrinsic to its being a book; you're doing something to that book. The book doesn't cause itself to be carried, or need to be carried, to be a book. So because it is carried, we can call it: something carried. But you can't say that a book is something that must be carried to be a book; you can't say, "a book is something carried", the way you can say "a triangle is something with three sides". Maybe you could say, "a book is something with pages", and if that is really the essence of being a book and only of being a book (let's say it is, just for the sake of argument), then you can say, "because it is something with pages, it is a book". So Plato is starting with "things" and talking about causes and essences affecting and comprising things. As long as that cause is not an essential property of that thing, it modifies the thing without modifying its essence, just like carrying a book "modifies" it (now it's being carried) without changing its essence as a book.

Steven Ravett Brown

In the context of the dialogue, the character Socrates is saying that an action is judged pious because it is pious. Not the other way round. So 'piety' cannot be defined as 'What x judges to be pious', even if x=God.

Geoffrey Klempner

Lindsay asked:

Can you tell me of a philosopher who contemplated on the existence of good vs. evil? Specifically, I'm wanting to know which of them concluded that good and evil are dual qualities of our God, that both are necessary elements that He had to construct for our existence here on Earth. That happens to be my position, but would love to read a "professional's" position on this.

Let me point to one thinker who is a bit "out of the way": Peter Abelard, who acquired historical fame as a lover rather than a philosopher (cf. Abelard and Heloise). But you may need to look under "Theology" to find his book Dialectica. As far as I'm aware, Abelard was the first of the medieval philosopher to come out with an explicit contention as in your question.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

There are two views, which you may be confusing:

1. The standard response to the problem of evil (the problem of how an omnibenevolent, omniciscient and omnipotent God would allow the existence of natural and moral evils) which is to say that the existence of evil in the world is conducive to a greater good.

2. The Manichean (Manichaean) Heresy — for which many a medieval scholar was burned at the stake — which holds that evil exists because God's power is insufficient to overcome the power of the Devil, who is responsible for the existence of evil.

Geoffrey Klempner

I do not know whether the sages and thinkers of ancient Persia (Iran), including Zarathoustra or Zoroaster, who contemplated and thought persistently on the existence of good vs evil could be called "professionals". However it is interesting to observe that the dualistic Mazdean tradition of Ohrmazd (Good) and Ahriman (Evil) contrast with the monistic thought of Zervanism or Zurvanism. According to Zervanism, from Zervan or Zurvan (Time — the unitary principle of God) emerge both Ohrmazd and Ahriman.

It is said that Zervanism was a major Zoroastrian heresy. R.C. Zaehner, in his book Zurvan; A Zoroastrian Dilemma Clarendon Press, Oxford 1955, supposes that it was a result of Babylonian influences which appeared towards the end of Achaemenid empire. It was perhaps the dominant tradition at the court of Sasanians (224—c 642 CE), the dynasty that ruled Persia until overthrown by the Arabs.

You may also read Mary Boyce's book, Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1979).

Jean Nakos

Rachel asked:

Is it more appropriate to speak of human rights rather than natural rights?

It depends on whether this is a moral question, philosophical question, or human question. That humans have rights need not be gainsaid and those rights are manifold: the right to life, free assembly, religious expression, political views, the right to life, employment education, freedom, peace, justice etc. The problem arises when those rights are either not recognised or denied. How does one respond to the denial of human rights? And what steps does one take to ensure that those rights are recognised and reinstated when they have been denied? But whether humans have rights simply because of their 'nature' is a different matter. I would suggest that whatever exists has rights, whether it sentient or not. Creation exists and, as a Christian, I obviously say that it exists because God wills it into being. But what exists does so because God wills it and not from any determinative necessity, therefore, since it is not necessary for creation to exist it is a contingent dependent on a necessity, since, I believe it is necessary that God exists. That creation is willed into being and given its own freedom and constituent elements e.g. laws, direction, development, the evolutionary process, physics etc., science may tell us how that creation is constructed but science does not reveal anything that is not already existent e.g. DNA always existed, science has simply dis-covered it, lifted the lid of it, so to speak, to reveal the glories and wonder of what is there in all its breathtaking beauty.

But such a creation also has rights, it has a right to exist and be itself independent of the utility value Man places on it. So, given that God wills creation freely, he also freely gives it rights — and those rights independent of Man. Perhaps we should begin to speak about a bi-lateral covenant agreement between creation and Man wherein the rights of all creation are guaranteed, respected, and when they are denied, how to effectively respond to them. As a Christian and a priest, especially a Franciscan, I would say that we speak of the rights of nature, including ours, and where those rights are denied or attack, then I consider it an attack on God him/ her/ itself.

Fr Seamus Mulholland OFM

May asked:

Can human beings make free choices of the kind required for moral responsibility? what kind of free choice you think is required for moral responsibility?

Free choices are not in fact required for moral responsibility. The question is often asked: "If nobody can make any free choices, then how can we hold anyone morally responsible?" But this completely forgets that if nobody really can make any free choices, it follows that we ourselves are not free to refrain from holding a thief or a murderer morally responsible, any more than the thief or murderer was free to refrain from stealing or murdering. If a thief was not free, then neither are we free to let us be persuaded that this somehow lets him off the hook.

T. P. Uschanov
Research Assistant
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki

Yaya asked:

I'm just wondering if there is an answer to this but why don't people just do whatever they want? Yes, they would feel guilty in a way if they did something wrong but who would care? Everyone will die. Their thoughts will also die with them. For example, no one would remember me since the people that I've known though out my life will forget me when they die. If someone would argue that people are remembered though the course of history, that is not true. When the sun goes out, every life form on this planet will disappear, erasing everything left behind by humans. Including the past, present, and future of our thoughts. There is a saying that what you do now will effect the future. Why would anyone care since the truth is that the end is death. Is there really a point in living? I'm sorry to say but I see no point. Earth is absolutely a hellhole. I believe that to bring a child into life is the most horrible thing that you could do. Is there really a point for anyone to be here?

Yaya alternates between asking genuine, heartfelt questions and asserting claims that seem to rule out answers in advance. Psychology is not philosophy. There are questions that arise from one's inquiring mind that are of interest to other such minds, and there are questions that stem from an investigation into one individual's mental state. I can address only the former.

Some of Yaya's questions presuppose states of affairs that are not obviously the case. For instance, who says people don't do whatever they want? People want a great many things, but they also realize that their wantings are not mutually compatible and so must be ordered (for example, wanting to sleep late and maintain good attendance at one's job). They do what they believe will advance their most important goals. Also, wanting to feel guilt-free is neither a trivial desire nor a function of knowing "who would care."

Some people are remembered through the course of history, and some are remembered longer than others, but Yaya laments that history will come to an end in the (apparently inevitable) heat-death of the universe and, with that, the abolition of all possible memory. First, it is not clear to me why, unless that heat-death is just around the corner, it is meaningless to care about one's immediate future and that of one's loved ones. Millions labor daily for just that, and for them that is enough. Second, even if heat-death were immanent or, perhaps more relevantly, if no human being will remember us or care whether we had lived and died, it still may be the case that God does and will. It may be, for all Yaya has shown to the contrary, that a divine lure has been involved in the self-creation of every fundamental entity via its mentality and has retained knowledge of every one of them. Third, that everlasting divine involvement may also issued in the order of the physical universe. The evolution of that order exhibits a pattern of increasing novelty, complexity, harmony, and contrast. It is not paradise, and the existence of far too many people is hellish, but it is anything but a unqualified "hellhole," if that word has any meaning.

Jerome asked:

What is the distinction between "choice" and "decision"?

If you have a choice there is more than one path you might opt for. When you make a decision you have settled on one of these.

Rachel Browne

Making a choice always implies making a decision, but there are circumstances where you can make a decision where one would speak of not having a choice — e.g. if someone 'makes you an offer you cannot refuse'.

Geoffrey Klempner

Arthur asked:

I think I could disprove god's existence (as described by monotheism). My ideas go as follows:

1- There can be no consciousness without change

2- Any entity above time can't change

3- Therefore, any entity above time (god) can't be conscious.

Thus god is either non-conscious (and thus would be impersonal like the Brahman of Hinduism) or he is ruled by time (not omnipotent, like the old gods of polytheism).

God as described by monotheism can never be omnipotent (above time) and conscious (personal) at the same time. I'd like to know how far are my words true.

Space asked:

What were the origins of Japanese philosophy?

The Japanese culture bear the imprint of several foreign traditions (Chinese, Indian, Korean, others). It is interesting to observe that Japan has adopted the Chinese way of writing with ideographs in the 4th century A.D. Also the name of Shinto, the indigenous tradition of Japan, was probably derived from the Chinese words "Shin Tao" (The Way of The God).

The main roots of the Japanese thought were; Shamanism (up to c 950 B.C), Buddhism, Confucianism (especially Chu Hsi Confucianism) and Taoism (Dokyo). I would suggest to consult Charles Moore, ed., Japanese Mind; Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture (University of Hawaii Press, 1982). If you do like things Japanese (including philosophy) then you should read Basil Chamberlain's Things Japanese (1890) which had many reprints and it is easy to find still today.

Jean Nakos

Ike asked:

According to John Locke, there is a natural right to property. Is he right?

I don't know what a "natural right" is, and really have no interest in what Locke said about it. However, if we consider "natural" to pertain to that horrible term, "human nature", which I will arbitrarily claim is related to what we have in common with other animals, then we can look to other animals in order to characterize what "property" is. And indeed, doing that, we find that animals do have property, in many senses of that word. Generally, they have "territories", i.e., actual physical areas (and/or volumes of space) which they defend against interlopers, which they use for food, shelter, and procreation, and which have, in most cases, reasonably well-defined boundaries (e.g., see Ardrey, R. The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. New York, NY: Dell Publishing Co., 1972.). Territories may, in addition, be abstracted to things like membership in packs, possession of objects, and domination over other animals. Now, doesn't this sound like what we call "property"? Thus, while the question of "rights" may be an open one, it is not open to debate (and there's much more than just Ardrey's book supporting this, at this point) as to whether we a) have, and b) need to have, property. Do we have a right to what seems an intrinsic aspect of, not only human, but all animal (and indeed most insects' and many plants') "nature"? An interesting question. But I'm not going to expound on it, because I'm not sure what a "right" is, or should be. Property, in some sense, does however seem necessary for humans.

Steven Ravett Brown

We can reasonably affirm that human beings have a natural right to property. We stipulate, however, that the term "right" does not refer to something tangible or a quality thereof. Having a right is not like having brown hair or money in the bank or a talent for singing. Rather, "right" refers to a relationship of moral owing or oughting that one person bears to another. This relationship, like any other, is not an object of sense perception, yet it can be grasped by intelligence and affirmed by reason. To say that some person X "has a right" means that (at least one) other person Y owes X. If such relationships are real, that is, affirmable by reason, then so are rights.